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The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation
Steven A. Bank
Why did the U.S. and U.K. -- two countries with similarly developed economies and 
corporate cultures -- originally diverge in their approaches to corporate income taxation and 
why have they continued to vacillate on this issue over time?  This Article concludes that it is 
a result of a divergence in firm dividend policies in the two countries.  While firms in both 
countries maintained liberal dividend policies during the nineteenth century, U.S. firms 
began to retain more earnings after the turn-of-the-century and this necessitated a change in 
the method of taxing corporate income.  In subsequent years, both countries have undergone 
major corporate tax reforms during periods of concern about the direction of firm dividend 
policies in their respective countries.  I suggest that this has important implications for 
predictions about the future of corporate income tax design.
There are a variety of approaches to taxing corporations and their shareholders.1
On this spectrum of choices, the United States and British corporate income taxes have 
traditionally stood at opposite ends.  The U.S. has what is called a "classical" corporate 
income tax,2 where corporate income is subject to tax at both the corporate level when 
earned and the shareholder level when distributed as a dividend.3  By contrast, the United 
Kingdom has historically had a shareholder imputation system, where shareholders are 
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1 For a sampling of methods from countries around the world, see HUGH J. AULT, COMPARATIVE INCOME 
TAXATION:  A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 285 (1997); PETER A. HARRIS, CORPORATE/SHAREHOLDER INCOME 
TAXATION 49-72 (1996).
2
 It is not considered "classical" because it is the older or more widely adopted system.  In fact, it emerged 
after the British system and it has never been the predominant system of taxing corporate income.  The 
name appears to relate to the fact that the "classical" view of the corporation is as a separate entity.  Thus, 
any tax that taxes the corporation as a separate entity is viewed as a classical tax.
3 See I.R.C. §§ 1(h) & 301.
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provided a credit for dividend payments.4  Depending upon the size of this credit, it 
reduces or eliminates the second layer of tax.  
This chasm between the two systems, however, has not always existed and both 
countries have made movements to close the gap at various points during the past 
century.  During the nineteenth century, both the U.S. and the U.K. had a pass-through 
approach to taxing corporate income.  While the U.S. switched to the classical approach 
in the early twentieth century, integration of the corporate and individual income taxes 
has been proposed several times, most recently by President George W. Bush in 2003.  
This latest effort culminated in a significant reduction in the double tax burden.5
Conversely, the U.K. has frequently experimented with a more classical approach, even 
adopting the U.S. system itself between 1965 and 1973.  In 1997, the U.K. all but
abandoned the shareholder imputation approach in a move that has nudged its system 
closer to a classical corporate income tax.6
Why did the U.S. and U.K. -- two countries with similarly developed economies 
and corporate cultures -- diverge in their approaches to corporate income taxation and 
why do the two countries continue to veer toward and away from each other on this 
issue?  One possible explanation is that the different methods of taxing corporate income 
are a reflection of the different theories of the corporation.7  According to this view, the 
4 See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 770.
5 See H.R. 2 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003.  After budgetary constraints helped to 
block a provision that would allow shareholders to exclude dividends from income altogether, the final act 
subjects dividends to capital gain rather than ordinary income rates.
6 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Back to the 1930s?  The Shaky Case for Exempting Dividends, 97 TAX NOTES
1599 (2002).
7 See, e.g., MARTIN DAUNTON, JUST TAXES:  THE POLITICS OF TAXATION IN BRITAIN 1914-1979 90 (2002) 
(suggesting the U.S. system was based upon the theory that the corporation is a real entity and the U.K. 
system, at least in its earlier form, was premised upon the theory that the corporation was an aggregate of 
its individual owners); Cf. Richard M. Hammer, The Taxation of Income from Corporate Shareholders:  
Review of Present Systems in Canda, France, Germany, Japan, and the U.K., NAT'L TAX J., Sept. 1973, at 
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U.S. system reflects the notion that the corporation is a real entity, while the U.K.'s 
suggests the corporation is a mere aggregate of its individual shareholders.  Under closer 
examination, however, entity theory has not proven to be a significant factor in corporate 
income tax design, at least in the U.S.8
This Article concludes that the divide between the U.S. and British corporate tax 
systems can be explained by a real and perceived divergence in corporate dividend 
policies.   During much of the nineteenth century, corporations in both the U.S. and the 
U.K. distributed most of their profits as dividends each year and raised capital through 
the debt or equity markets.9  Around the turn-of-the-century, however, a fundamental 
change in U.S. corporate finance began to occur.  Corporations started to retain an 
increasing percentage of their earnings as an internal method of financing expansion and 
other needs.10  During this same period, no such change occurred in U.K. corporate 
finance.  British corporations were no longer distributing all of their earnings each year as 
dividends, but they did not follow the lead of U.S. corporations in building up substantial 
reserves.  In fact, British observers reportedly referred to the trend toward increased 
315, 323 ("Integration at any level, corporate or shareholder, is based on the same rationale, ie., that a 
corporation is merely the aggregation of its shareholders and, since under this reasoning the taxation of a 
corporation and its shareholders cannot be disassociated, the corporation tax is to be viewed, and treated to 
an extent, as an advance payment of the shareholder's tax."); RICHARD GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME 
TAX 9 (1951) ("The corporation income tax is based on the usual legal view that a corporation and its 
stockholders are separate persons.").
8 See Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 447 (2001) ("Entity Theory Myth").
9 WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS:  FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 244 (1915).  See JONATHON BARRON 
BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 159 (1997) (“corporate practice 
reflected a strong preference for debt financing in both the United States and Britain during the nineteenth 
century, even in the absence of any substantial tax benefits.”).  
10 See Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? Evidence from History, 
56 TAX L. REV. 463, 480 (2003) ("Scapegoat") (citing Cowles Commission data on retained earnings 
between 1885 and 1939).
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retained earnings in the U.S. as the "American theory" of corporate finance because it 
both began in and was originally confined to the States.11
This divergence in firm dividend policies had a significant effect on the direction 
of corporate income taxation in the two countries.  During the nineteenth century, when 
corporations in both countries distributed virtually all of their profits each year, it was 
reasonable to view a tax on corporations as a mere proxy for taxing shareholders 
individually on their allocable share of corporate profits.  This proxy, which allowed for 
the collection of the tax at the source, was considered a significant innovation for tax 
systems suffering under the burden of tax evasion.  Not surprisingly, therefore, the United 
States and the United Kingdom were aligned in their use of a pass-through or integrated 
approach to corporate income taxation during this period.  The U.K., under the Income 
Tax Act of 1803,12 and the subsequent Income Tax Act of 1842,13 integrated the 
corporate and individual income taxes through an imputation system.  Corporations were 
subject to an income tax.14  Shareholders then received a credit for taxes paid on the 
income at the corporate level and corporations were entitled to deduct from the dividends 
paid an amount sufficient to cover the corporate-level tax.15  In this sense, the corporate 
11 See BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS:  PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE 379 (2d 
ed. 1940).
12
 Income Tax Act, Geo. III, ch. 122, § 127 (1803) (Eng.).
13
 Income Tax Act, 5 & 6 Vict., ch. 35, § 54 (1842) (Eng.)  The Income Tax Act of 1842 was essentially a 
"reprint" of the 1803 Act with respect to its treatment of corporate income, with only the section numbers 
changing.  I INCOME TAX CODIFICATION COMMITTEE REPORT, Cmd. 5131 9 (1936) (hereinafter "1936 
INCOME TAX CODIFICATION COMMITTEE REPORT").
14
 Corporations were subject to a tax on the "amount of the annual profits, and gains" of the company 
"before any dividend shall have been" paid.  Income Tax Act of 1803, § 127, 44 Stat. 800; Income Tax Act 
of 1842, § 54. 
15 Under section 127 of the 1803 Act, companies were entitled to "a proportionate deduction in respect of 
the duty so charged." Income Tax Act of 1803, § 127, 44 Stat. at 801.  While there was no specific 
exemption from taxation for dividends in the hands of the individual shareholders, the practice was "to 
regard the dividends paid to shareholders as distributions of profits which had already paid tax in the hands 
of the company, and the shareholders (like partners) as immune from further taxation in respect of the sums 
so distributed to them."  1936 INCOME TAX CODIFICATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 61. 
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tax operated as a withholding tax for the individual income tax.16  In the U.S., the 
corporate and individual income taxes were also integrated during the nineteenth century, 
although through different methods.17  During the Civil War and Reconstruction, a pass-
through approach was employed.  There was no separate corporate income tax; instead, 
shareholders were simply taxed on the undivided profits of the corporation.18  When the 
income tax was revived in the short-lived Tariff Act of 1894,19 a corporate income tax 
was imposed and dividends were exempt from the individual income tax.
The increasing conservatism of firm dividend policies in the U.S. necessitated a 
change in the taxation of corporations soon after the income tax reappeared in 1913.20
Initially, the corporate income tax system adopted in the Revenue Act of 1913 -- the first 
post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax in the U.S. -- was similar to its 1894 predecessor.  
Because the 1913 Act imposed progressive rather than flat rates, however, the 1894 Act's 
dividend exemption was not a precise method of integration.  Thus, Congress chose to 
implement its progressive rates by means of a surtax on all income regardless of source.  
Dividends were exempt from the "normal" tax, but not the surtax.  Since the corporate 
16 See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 76.  This is considered Lord Addington's "most brilliant" use of the taxation 
of the source principle, which he introduced as a way to ease the burden of the income tax on individual 
privacy. SEAN REAMONN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CORPORATE TAX 29 (1970); In his speech introducing 
the income tax, Addington noted 
"[o]ne of the greatest inconveniences which could be attributed to the late Income Tax was, the 
necessity and hardship it imposed on individuals, in making a full disclosure of the amount of their 
fortunes.  However similar the measure which I am about to propose may be to the tax which I 
have alluded to, that inconvenience will in this be in a great measure obviated."
A. FARNSWORTH, ADDINGTON:  AUTHOR OF THE MODERN INCOME TAX 52 (1951) (quoting Addington, 
[Speech delivered to Parliament], THE TIMES, June 14, 1803, at 13).
17 See generally, Bank, Entity Theory Myth, supra note 8, at 447.
18
 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 282. In certain industries, corporations were subject to 
a “dividend tax.”
19
 Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.
20
 For a more complete discussion of the gradual move away from the integration scheme, see Bank, 
Scapegoat, supra note 10.
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income tax and normal tax rate were identical, the result was effectively an integrated 
corporate and shareholder base tax with a surtax overlay.  Congress soon realized, 
however, that it could no longer count on the corporate tax as a mere withholding 
mechanism for the individual income tax if corporations did not distribute all of their 
profits each year.  This problem worsened as surtax rates rose farther above the corporate 
income tax rate.21   Thus, Congress had to increase the corporate tax as a form of 
surrogate surtax to recover revenue lost because the profits were not subject to the 
individual surtax.  While the exemption from the individual normal tax for dividends 
remained for a period of time, the rise in the corporate rate made it an increasingly 
marginal source of relief for the double taxation of corporate income.22  In 1936, the 
dividend exemption was repealed entirely when Congress adopted an undistributed 
profits tax.23  Corporate income was thus subject to two layers of tax -- the corporate 
income tax and the individual income tax -- plus the undistributed profits tax if the 
corporate income was retained prior to distribution.  The undistributed profits tax was 
removed entirely by 1939, but the dividend tax remained.  Corporate managers had little 
incentive to fight to remove double taxation since its bias against dividends gave them an 
additional excuse to retain earnings.24  The disconnecting of the corporate and individual 
taxes, as well as the subsequent elimination of the dividend exemption, can be traced to 
the change in dividend policy among U.S. firms.
21 See infra Figure 3 (comparing the individual surtax and corporate income tax rates between 1913 and 
1935).
22 See supra Figure 4 (comparing the corporate income tax rate and individual normal tax rates between 
1913 and 1935).
23
 For a more complete discussion of the events leading up to and following the adoption of an 
undistributed profits tax in 1936 and the elimination of the dividend exemption, see generally Steven A. 
Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167 
(2002) ("Agency Costs").
24 See id.
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Since British firms maintained their more liberal dividend policies, Parliament 
continued to rely on the shareholder imputation system as its primary method of reaching 
corporate income.  Under the Income Tax Act of 1918, an imputation system similar to 
the one first adopted in 1803 was employed.25  Corporations were subject to an entity-
level income tax, but they were entitled to recover taxes paid at the corporate level by 
deducting them from dividends paid.  Shareholders included the pre-deduction dividend 
amount in income and then were provided a credit for the taxes paid.  This integration 
system was partially disrupted by a non-creditable profits tax enacted during World War 
I,26 but it was repealed soon after the end of hostilities.  
Subsequent efforts to modify the U.S. and British approaches to corporate income 
taxation have been a reaction to real and perceived developments in dividend policy in 
the two countries.   While the advent of retained earnings prompted the U.S. to separate 
the corporate and individual income taxes in the first place, the perception of excessive 
retained earnings has periodically led it to waver from the double tax scheme.  In 1936, 
when President Roosevelt proposed replacing the corporate income tax with an 
undistributed profits tax and a shareholder-level tax on dividends, the worry was that 
corporate hoarding was at least partially to blame for the Crash and the ensuing 
Depression.27  More recently, many people blamed Enron and the associated corporate 
scandals with the reported decline in dividend-paying companies.28   The theory was that 
corporate hoarding led companies to misuse funds.  President Bush's proposal to 
25 See Income Tax Act of 1918, ch. 40, General Rules Applicable to Schedules A, B, C, D, and E at par. 20.
26 See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 89.
27 See Bank, Agency Costs, supra note 23, at 184-192.
28 See Jeremy J. Siegel, The Dividend Deficit, WALL ST. J., February 13, 2002, at A20; Edward J. 
McCaffery, Manager's Journal:  Remove a Major Incentive to Cheat, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2002, at B2.
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eliminate double taxation was at least partially justified as a method of addressing this 
concern.29
The British experience has been the opposite of that of the U.S.  While the U.S. 
has been concerned with excessive retained earnings, the British focus has been on 
excessive dividends.  In 1947, the differential Profits Tax, so-c alled because it 
differentiated between retained and distributed income by subjecting the latter to a 
heavier rate of tax, was enacted to encourage corporations to increase their savings and 
investments after World War II.  Part of the concern was that the dividends increased 
purchasing power and fed post-war inflationary pressures.30  After the differential feature 
in the Profits Tax was dropped in 1958, the British once again became concerned about 
excessive dividends.  In 1965, Parliament abandoned the Profits Tax in favor of a brief 
experiment with the classical system of double taxation.  Through this system, the British 
hoped to encourage corporations to "plough back" more earnings into the business and 
thereby jump start investment and the economy.31  After repealing the double tax and 
returning to an imputation system for more than twenty-five years, Parliament once again 
turned to corporate tax reform in 1997.  The stated objective, which was to encourage 
companies to reinvest profits, echoed the proclamations of earlier reform movements.32
Thus, the U.S. and British corporate income tax systems have evolved in response 
to changes in dividend policy, changes that were motivated at least in part by a number of 
29 See Joint Committee on Taxation, Eliminate the Double Taxation of Corporate Earnings ["Bluebook on 
Integration"], Jan. 2003, at 1 (available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/bluebook.pdf) 
30 See The Budget, TIMES (London), Apr. 16, 1947, at 5 (speech of Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh 
Dalton); Morris Beck, British Anti-Inflationary Tax on Distributed Corporate Profits, 1948 NAT'L TAX J. 
275.
31 See Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, The New United Kingdom Tax Structure in Relation to the Needs of the 
Economy, 5 EUROPEAN TAX'N 212, 215 (1965) (Callaghan was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time).
32 See Peter Casson, International Aspects of the U.K. Imputation System of Corporate Taxation, 1998 
BRIT. TAX REV. 493 (statement of Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown).
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non-tax related factors.  This finding should have important implications for those 
seeking to unify the corporate income tax systems of these and other countries and for 
those trying to predict the direction of corporate tax reform.  The Article begins in Part I 
by tracing the transformation from the liberal dividend policy that predominated in both 
the U.S. and the U.K. during the nineteenth century to a policy of increased retained 
earnings among U.S. companies around the turn-of-the-century.  Part II describes how 
this change in dividend policy led to a divergence of the corporate income tax in the two 
countries.  Rather than using the corporate income tax as a proxy for a tax on shareholder 
income, which made sense in an era in which corporations paid out almost all of their 
earnings as dividends each year, Congress began to focus on the corporation as a separate 
taxable entity.  Since the change in norms regarding dividend policy was an exclusively 
American phenomenon at the time, the British corporate income tax continued to be a 
shareholder-focused imputation system.  In Part III, the Article discusses how the two 
corporate income tax systems continue to be driven in large part by real or perceived 
changes in dividend policy.  Finally, the Article briefly concludes by suggesting how 
these findings might impact corporate income tax reform not just in the U.S. and the U.K, 
but globally. 
I. The Divergence in Firm Dividend Policies 
During the nineteenth century, dividends flowed freely in both the U.S. and the 
U.K.  According to one observer, “[i]t was the common practice to divide all profits in 
sight and to finance new construction by the issue of securities.  Such policies were fully 
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sanctioned by the public opinion of the day.”33 By the turn-of-the-century, however 
dividend policies in the U.S. and U.K. began to diverge.
A. U.S. corporations shift to more conservative dividend policies
Corporate finance theory regarding dividends began to change at the end of the 
nineteenth century, long before the enactment of the income tax in 1913.  Whereas the 
conventional wisdom during much of the nineteenth century had been to distribute all or 
almost all of a corporation's earnings as dividends and raise expansion capital through the 
debt or equity markets, by World War I the conventional wisdom was that a corporation 
should “plow back” a substantial percentage of its earnings to fund expansion, protect 
against downturns, maintain regular dividend policies, and provide for unexpected 
expenses.  In his 1917 treatise on business finance, William Lough noted that "[i]t is 
generally agreed that regular dividends combined with large -- or at least adequate --
savings out of annual income should be features of the financial management of most 
corporations."34  A few years later, one observer reported that "[t]oday it is taken for 
granted that no corporation shall pay out more than a fraction of its earnings."35
The available data suggests that this change in corporate finance theory was 
reflected in a change in actual dividend policies.  As Figure 1 illustrates, while dividends 
hovered around 80 to 90 percent of earnings prior to the turn-of-the-century, they had 
33 RIPLEY, supra note 9, at 244.  See BASKIN & MIRANTI, JR., supra note 9, at 159 (“corporate practice 
reflected a strong preference for debt financing in both the United States and Britain during the nineteenth 
century, even in the absence of any substantial tax benefits.”); Ken Brown, So, Will Stock Dividends Get 
Back Their Respect?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Dec. 10, 2002 (quoting Roger Ibbotson, Professor of Finance at 
Yale)("In the 19th century, it was common practice to pay out everything."); William N. Goetzmann et al., 
A New Historical Database for the NYSE 1815 to 1925:  Performance and Predictability, J. FIN. MGMT 10
(Dec. 2000) (". . . this discrepancy between equity yields and bond yields over the course of a decade in our 
sample period suggests that dividend policy was quite different in the 19th century than it was in the 20th 
century.  The high yields and the fact that many stocks traded near par suggest that most companies paid 
out a large share of their profits, rather than retaining them."). 
34 WILLIAM H. LOUGH, BUSINESS FINANCE 477 (1917).
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dropped to approximately 50 to 60 percent of earnings during the first decade or so of the 
twentieth century.36
35
 Oswald W. Knauth, The Place of Corporate Surplus in the National Income, 18 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 157, 
164 (June 1922).  
36
 While the omission of closely held corporations and the inadequacy of nineteenth century financial 
reporting caution against reading too much into the data, see Bank, Scapegoat, supra note 10, at 468 -71, 
the graph nevertheless highlights that corporate dividend payments dropped during the years preceding the 
adoption of the modern income tax in 1913.
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  Figure 1   
U.S. Payout ratio by year, 1871-1913
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See COWLES COMMISSION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS, COMMON-STOCK INDEXES 2 (2d ed., 1939) 
(“COWLES COMMISSION”); Jack W. Wilson & Charles P. Jones, An Analysis of the S&P 500 Index and 
Cowles's Extensions:  Price Indexes and Stock Returns, 1870-1999, 75 J. BUS. 505, 527-531, Appendix:  
Table A1 (standardizing and updating the data originally compiled by the Cowles Commission for the 
period 1871 through 1939).  "Payout ratio" is defined as the dividends divided by the earnings for the 
indicated year.
A variety of factors contributed to this shift to a more conservative dividend 
policy, but the overriding factor was the increasing public ownership, and therefore 
separation of ownership and control, of corporate enterprise.  Prior to the 1880s, most 
industrial or manufacturing companies other than the large transportation concerns were 
small, privately held (often by members of the same family), and frequently 
unincorporated.37  Between 1880 and 1930, however, the small, privately held, family-
controlled business gradually gave way to the large, publicly traded, manager-controlled 
37 See Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611, 1640 (1981); 
BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 9, at 193.
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corporation.38  As Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means detailed in their famous 1932 study,39
by 1930 a substantial majority of the 200 largest corporations were controlled by 
management rather than by an individual or group of individual owners.40  Moreover, 
only four of the 200 largest corporations during this time period did not have publicly 
traded stock.41
This separation of ownership and control had important implications for both 
manager and stockholder attitudes toward dividend policy.  For managers, retaining 
earnings was the easiest method of financing expansion and thereby increasing their own 
power and prestige.42  Although there are many valid reasons for adopting a more 
conservative dividend policy,43 managers frequently retained earnings at the expense of 
shareholder interests.44  This principal-agent problem was readily apparent to 
contemporary observers.45  As one economist observed in 1933, "[t]he separation of 
38 See Werner, supra note 37, at 1641.
39 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
94 (1932).  
40 Id.  Even before Berle and Means published their study, the separation of ownership and control was 
increasingly evident.  William Ripley, writing in 1927, noted that “[t]he prime fact confronting us as a 
nation is the progressive diffusion of ownership on the one hand and of the ever-increasing concentration of 
managerial power on the other.”  WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 131 (1927).
41 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 39, at 49.
42
 According to one study of seventy-two public companies during the period from 1922-1930, almost half 
of the companies financed their growth exclusively with retained earnings and three-fourths used retained 
earnings for at least 50% of their financing.  O.J. Curry, Utilization of Corporate Profits in Prosperity and 
Depression, 9 MICH. BUS. STUD. 1, 37 (1941) (noting that some of the companies actually issued stocks 
and bonds to raise expansion capital for immediate needs, but quickly retired such securities from retained 
earnings).  Moreover, such retentions constituted a significant percentage of the corporation's total assets, 
with almost half of the companies in the study reinvesting profits equal to 50 percent of the value of the 
company.  Id.
43
 Such reasons might include the inability to access funds through the debt or equity markets on acceptable 
terms or the need to cushion against downturns. 
44 RIPLEY, supra note 40, at 150 (“for many of the [prospering companies during the Twenties] the 
rebuilding of the plant from earnings, undertaking very expensive extensions through charges to operation, 
the accumulation of all sorts of reserves, has gone on seemingly without regard to the right of the present 
generation of shareholders to the immediate enjoyment of the income of the business.”).  
45
 For a general discussion of the principal-agent, or agency cost, problem in modern economics and 
finance literature, see Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 323, 323 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost 
Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650, 650 (1984); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and 
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ownership and management has left the stockholders, i.e., the owners, with hardly any 
influence on the investment of corporate savings.  How is management to overcome the 
temptation of ploughing earnings back into the institution, even if retrenchment were 
wiser than expansion?"46  Another observer was even more blunt in his assessment of 
managers' motives for retained earnings, noting that "the overexpansion of fixed assets, 
which characterized the latter period [1926-1930], was due in no small measure to the 
disinclination of directors to relinquish earnings to stockholders; and being disinclined to 
pay out earnings in dividends, directors sought to reinvest them in the fixed assets of the 
business."47  While the criticism of retained earnings may have been overstated,48 there 
was little doubt that, as one study concluded, "retained earnings resulted more from 
selfish reasons than from general conservatism."49
the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
46
 Robert Weidenhammer, Causes and Repercussions of the Faulty Investment of Corporate Savings, 23 
AM. ECON. REV. 35, 40 (1933).  See Norman S. Buchanan, Theory and Practice in Dividend Distribution, 
53 Q. J. ECON. 64, 81 (1938) ("recently many writers have stressed the growing separation of ownership 
and control in the large corporation.  Under these conditions, one is perhaps unjustified in assuming that 
dividend policy will be framed with the interests of the shareholders to the fore.  Could this possibly 
explain the tendency to reinvest a large share of the earnings, at least for these corporations?").  Even 
managers recognized the stakes for this separation of ownership and control.  The president of General 
Motors wrote that “there is a point beyond which diffusion of stock ownership must enfeeble the 
corporation by depriving it of virile interest in management upon the part of some one man or group of men 
to whom its success is a matter of personal and vital interest.  And conversely at the same point the public 
interest becomes involved when the public can no longer locate some tangible personality within the 
ownership which it may hold responsible for the corporation’s conduct.”  RIPLEY, supra note 40, at 131 
(quoting president of G.M.).
47 ARTHUR STONE DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 616-17 (3d ed. 1934). 
48
 Arthur Dewing, an early expert in corporate finance, explained that "[t]he simplest and most evident 
method of obtaining capital to meet the expenditures of an expanding business is through the reinvestment 
of surplus earnings."  Id., at 933-34.
  Furthermore, there was ample evidence of companies going bankrupt in part because dividends were too 
high during a period in which the company should have been creating a cushion out of retained earnings.  
See HARTLEY WITHERS, STOCKS AND SHARES 157 (3d ed. 1938) ("In frequent instances Companies, after 
paying dividends of fifteen and twenty per cent. for years, have gone into liquidation within twelve months
of their last high dividend through their not having in hand a reserve out of which to meet a temporary 
depression in their particular line of business.").
49
 Curry, supra note 42, at 8.  See RIPLEY, supra note 40, at 150 (“But there is unquestionably a point 
beyond which conservatism in the distribution of profits becomes a vice instead of a virtue – particularly 
when full disclosure of the undistributed profits is denied.”); Weidenhammer, supra note 46, at 40 (noting 
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Stockholders encouraged managers' push for retained earnings by advocating for 
regular dividends.  For an increasingly distant and more economically diverse group of 
stockholders,50 regular dividends generally were preferable to the wild swings of the 
typical nineteenth-century company’s annual earnings.51  Experts advised that such 
regularity could only be achieved by retaining sufficient earnings in the profitable years 
to cover the lean years.52  Despite the neutral character of such advice, some managers 
used it as an excuse to retain sufficient earnings retentions to fund their own projects.53
As one commentator noted, "[p]robably the first idea was to ensure dividends for the lean 
years.  It is a matter of pride to point to an unbroken dividend record, and annual changes 
in the rate are not desired by any one; but surpluses are not retained entirely in the liquid 
form necessary to ensure the fixity of dividends, being often used to increase the fixed 
assets."54  Thus, the demand for more regularity may have served as cover for the more 
base instincts driving managers to favor a more conservative dividend policy.
B. British companies maintained more generous dividend policies
British companies maintained liberal dividend policies long after U.S. firms had 
switched to policies geared to higher retention of earnings.  By 1917, William Lough 
wrote that "[t]he tendency in European countries is much more strongly in favor of 
that many managers chose to reinvest profits in expansion of the business because the size of their own 
salaries was tied more directly to the size of the business than to the rate of return for stockholders).
50
 Whereas fewer than 4.5 million individuals owned stock in 1900, more than triple that number -- almost 
14.5 million -- owned shares by 1922.  H.T. Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the 
United States, 39 Q. J. ECON. 15, 15 (1924).
51 See Donald E. Wilbur, A Study of the Policy of Dividend Stabilization, 10 HARV. BUS. REV. 373, 373 
(1932) ("With the expansion of the stock market and the wide distribution of equities among the American 
public, new significance has been placed upon the importance of maintaining regular dividends year in and 
year out.").
52 LOUGH, supra note 34, at 444 (advising that in order to ensure regularity, "dividends must not be allowed 
to rise, even in the most prosperous periods, above a conservative estimate of the minimum earnings of the 
company.").
53 See GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 11, at 374-78.
54
 Knauth, supra note 35, at 164.
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paying out the greater portion of earnings in the form of dividends than it is in the United 
States."55  As Figure 2 demonstrates, during the 1920s, U.K. companies paid out 
dividends at approximately the same rate -- 80 percent -- as U.S. firms did during the 
nineteenth century, while U.S. firms were only paying out as dividends approximately 50 
to 60 percent of earnings.  Stated differently, British companies on average retained 
approximately 20 percent of their earnings while U.S. companies retained approximately 
twice as much -- between 40 and 50 percent of earnings.56
55 LOUGH, supra note 34, at 439.
56 Cf. SERGEI P. DOBROVOLSKY, CORPORATE INCOME RETENTION 1915-1943, Appendix C, Table C2, at 
110 (1951) (National Bureau of Economic Research study finding retained earnings for U.S. companies in
the study averaged approximately 45-50% during the 1920s); W.A. THOMAS, THE FINANCE OF BRITISH 
INDUSTRY 1918-1976, Table 4.2, at 89 (1978) (In an analysis of The Economist's compilation of published 
U.K. company accounts during the period, found retained earnings averaged approximately 20 percent); 
COLIN CLARK, NATIONAL INCOME AND OUTLAY 186-87 (1937) (noting that during the years 1924-35, the 
retained earnings of British companies were never as high as 25% of profits and in many years they were 
substantially less) ; A. Wilfred May, American and European Valuation of Equity Capital:  A Comparison, 
29 AM. ECON. REV. 734, 735, Tbl. 1 (1939) (compilation of U.S. data from 135 corporations during the 
period 1922-26 and 403 corporations from 1927-29 and British data from 420-459 companies, finding that 
the U.S. firms retained between 45 and 65 percent and the U.K. firms retained between 70 and 80 percent).
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Figure 2
Dividend Payout Ratios in the U.S. 
and U.K., 1922-1929
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U.S.:  Jack W. Wilson & Charles P. Jones, An Analysis of the S&P 500 Index and Cowles's Extensions:  
Price Indexes and Stock Returns, 1870-1999, 75 J. BUS. 505, 527-531 (2002) (Based on data compiled by 
the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, Common-Stock Indexes (2d ed. 1939));  U.K.:  W.A. 
THOMAS, THE FINANCE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY 1918-1976 89, tbl 4.2 (1978) (Based on data compiled in The 
Economist, December 17, 1938, at 600). 
This divergence of dividend policies among U.S. and British firms continued throughout 
the pre-World War II era.  In 1940, Benjamin Graham and David Dodd observed the 
following in their treatise on securities:
It is important to note that this feature [tendency toward high retained earnings] is 
peculiar to American corporate finance and has no close counterpart in the other 
important countries.  The typical English, French or German company pays out 
practically all the earnings of each year, except those carried to reserves.  Hence 
they do not build up large profit-and-loss surpluses, such as are common in the 
United States.  Capital for expansion purposes is provided abroad not out of 
undistributed earnings but through the sale of additional stock.57
57 GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 11, at 379.
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While the British reserves might have been inflated to serve the same purpose as 
American surplus accounts,58 Graham and Dodd note that "these reserve accounts rarely 
attain a comparable magnitude."59
A variety of factors appeared to conspire to keep down retained earnings among 
U.K. companies, but the principal factor may be that the trend toward separation of 
ownership and control occurred later in the U.K. than in the U.S.  Whereas Adolf Berle 
and Gardiner Means noted this phenomenon in U.S. companies in 1932,60 it was as late as 
the 1970s before British observers found evidence of a similar development.61  This may 
have had significant effect on the alignment of incentives over dividend policy.  In the 
U.S., managers sought to retain earnings as a method of funding expansion projects that 
would enhance their own prestige and compensation.62  Retained earnings were 
preferable to securing additional debt or equity because the managers would not be 
subject to the scrutiny of the capital markets in the use of such funds.  In the U.K., the 
growth of the managerial class was delayed to some extent by the persistence of family 
control.63  Families that retained a significant percentage of the stock in a corporation 
may have demanded cash distributions to placate those individuals who needed a steady 
source of income.  
Moreover, even where separation of ownership and control had occurred, 
shareholders maintained a degree of influence over dividends in British corporations that 
58 In fact, the British worried about companies' "secret reserve accounts," which could be used to hide 
profits that were not distributed to shareholders.  See HORACE B. SAMUEL, SHAREHOLDERS’ MONEY 269 
(1933) ("One of the most classic variations of the technique of inflating or deflating profits at the will of the 
Board is that system of secret reserves which is one of the cornerstones of modern Company finance").
59 GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 11, at 379.
60 See BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra note 39, at 4.
61 See Brian R. Cheffins, History and the Global Corporate Governance Revolution:  The UK Perspective, 
43 BUS. HIST. 87, 89-90 (2001).
62 See supra text accompanying notes 42-49. 
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did not exist in the U.S.  From early on in the history of British companies, shareholders 
of most companies were accorded the right to vote on the Board's recommendation to 
declare a dividend.64  This right was incorporated in Table A of the U.K.'s Company 
Acts,65 which provided a default rule for companies to adopt in constructing their 
charters.66  While shareholders generally could not vote to change the amount of a 
Board's recommended dividend and they could not initiate a dividend,67 they could veto a 
dividend recommendation.  U.S. shareholders have never held even that much power 
over the dividend decision.  The established norm of shared or at least quasi-shared 
responsibility for the dividend decision in British companies may have perpetuated their 
high dividend payout ratios,68 especially since the depressed profits for British firms 
during the 1920s made maintaining level dividend payments more difficult.69  As 
Benjamin Graham and David Dodd observed, "the mere fact that the dividend policy is 
submitted to the stockholders for their specific approval or criticism carries an 
63 See Cheffins, supra note 61, at 90.
64
 According to Professor Colleen Dunlavy's forthcoming database on corporate charters, which describes 
dividend and other provisions in a series of UK charters adopted between 1845 and 1865, two-thirds of the 
charters included provisions requiring shareholder approval for declaration of a dividend.  For a description 
of the database, see http://history.wisc.edu/dunlavy/Corporations/c_database.htm.
65 See IX Companies Act of 1862, Cap. 89, First Schedule, Table A, par.72 (Eng.) ("The Directors may, 
with the Sanction of the Company in General Meeting, declare a Dividend to be paid to the Members in 
proportion to their shares.").
66
 For many companies, the articles of association adopted Table A in toto, including the provision for 
shareholder vote on dividends, except where specifically excluded or modified.  See Fisher v. Black and 
White Publishing Co., 1901 Law Reports 174 (Ch. 1900).
67
 II Companies Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23, par. 89 (Eng.) (“The company in general meeting may 
declare dividends, but no dividend shall exceed the amount recommended by the directors.”).  Cf. 
Companies Act of 1985, ch. 6, par. 102 (Eng.) (“Subject to the provisions of the Act, the company may be 
ordinary resolution declare dividends in accordance with the respective rights of the members, but no 
dividend shall exceed the amount recommended by the directors.”).
68 See Buchanan, supra note 46, at 83 n.7 ("The tendency to distribute a larger share of the total annual 
earnings as dividends in Great Britain may, however, be partially explained by the rather common practice 
of having the shareholders vote upon the question in meeting, rather than leaving the dividends to be 
determined by the directors as in American corporations.").
69 See A.J. Arnold, Profitability and Capital Accumulation in British Industry During the Transwar Period, 
1913-1924, 52 ECON. HIST. REV. 45, 48 (1999).  The vast majority of investors preferred current income 
rather than capital appreciation.  See SAMUEL, supra note 58, at 145 (“Excluding that comparatively small 
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exceedingly valuable reminder to the management of its responsibilities, and to the 
owners of their rights, on this important question."70
The emerging divergence between British and American attitudes toward 
dividend policy was evident in stockholder disputes.71  Railroads were ahead of the curve 
in the trend toward retained earnings,72 perhaps in part because they were also ahead of 
the curve in the separation of ownership and control, and therefore they were at the center 
of such disputes.  In 1881, for example, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company’s relatively 
conservative dividend policy came under fire.  Representatives of a group of British 
stockholders attended a stockholders meeting “to express their views that all earnings 
should be distributed to the stockholders and all capital improvements financed by 
security issues.”73  According to the company records, “[t]hese efforts continued over a 
number of years, and as the amount of [British] holding continued to grow, President 
Roberts and the directors were required to put forth considerable effort to keep the 
domestic stockholders united in support of the more conservative policy.”74
number of persons who buy for capital appreciation, the majority of investors in this country purchase 
securities in the hope of enjoying the dividends that they anticipate will be paid.”).
70 GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 11, at 383, n.1.
71
 This was an important issue because of the increasing degree of British investment in U.S. companies.  
See BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 9, at 130 (documenting a rise from $1.1 billion in 1876 to over $4 
billion in 1914); HERBERT FEISS, EUROPE:  THE WORLD'S BANKER 1870-1914 21 (1930) (noting a 
resumption of British investment in the U.S. after the Panic of 1893).  
72 See RIPLEY, supra note 9, at 244 ("But a few roads, undoubtedly well in advance of their time, during the 
'80s began to devote a good part of their earnings to new construction and betterment."); William Z. Ripley, 
Stock Watering, 26 POL. SCI. Q. 98, 105 (1911) ("Betterments or improvements by the best of our railroads 
have commonly been in part paid for out of surplus income.  Therein lies the great benefit of American 
over English practice.  Dividends have been withheld, sometimes for years, in order to build up a road.").
73 GEORGE H. BURGESS & MILES C. KENNEDY, CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD 
COMPANY 1846-1946 441 (1949).  For a general discussion of the advent of British stockholders 
committees in the American railroad industry, see DOROTHY R. ADLER, BRITISH INVESTMENT IN 
AMERICAN RAILWAYS 1834-1898 173-74 (Muriel E. Hidy, ed., 1970).
74 BURGESS & KENNEDY, supra note 73, at 441.  See id. at 443 (“The policy of investing a considerable 
portion of the company’s earnings in improvements and extensions of its property was doubtless one reason 
for the regard in which its securities were held, though this same policy met with great opposition from 
some of its stockholders, as has been said.”).  Foreign ownership of the Pennsylania Railroad increased 
from 7.37 percent in 1871 to 47.46 percent in 1888.  See ADLER, supra note 73, at 176, n.30.
DRAFT 7/13/2004
21
II. Firm Dividend Policy and the Divergence in Corporate Income Taxation 
In the twentieth century, the U.S. and U.K. approaches to the taxation of corporate 
income began to diverge.  While the U.K. primarily continued the shareholder imputation 
system that was first adopted in 1803, the U.S. approach soon changed.  Because of its 
concerns about a growing trend toward retained earnings in the U.S., Congress began 
raising the corporate rate beyond the normal individual rate and otherwise subjecting 
corporations to what increasingly looked like a separate entity tax.  Since British 
companies did not follow their U.S. counterparts in this change in dividend policy, the 
U.K. taxation of company income did not need to change from its original approach.
A. U.S.
The change in corporate finance toward a more conservative dividend policy 
among U.S. companies was a persistent problem for lawmakers after the ratification of 
the Sixteenth Amendment.  Congress enacted the corporate income tax in 1894 under the 
assumption that most corporations distributed all or nearly all of their earnings each year 
as dividends and raised expansion capital through the debt or equity markets.  While 
dividend policies were beginning to change even by then, it was still part of the 
conventional wisdom for the management of corporate enterprise.  Therefore, the quasi-
withholding provision view of the corporate income tax was plausible.  By 1913, 
however, when the first post-Sixteenth Amendment revenue act was enacted, the upward 
trend in retained earnings was clearly noticeable.  If the individual income tax had been 
adopted with a flat rate, this might not have mattered since retentions would be subject to 
the same rate of tax as distributions.  The adoption of progressive individual surtax rates, 
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though, meant that the corporate income tax could only serve as an imperfect withholding 
tax at best for the individual income tax.  Congress spent much of the first two decades of 
the modern income tax battling with corporate managers over this problem of retained 
earnings.  
1. Revenue Act of 1913
Upon ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment,75 Congress adopted a corporate 
income tax in conjunction with the individual income tax imposed under the Revenue Act 
of 1913.76  Congress minimized the risk of double taxation, however, by excluding 
dividends from what was called the "normal" tax on individual income.77  Under the 1913 
Act, all individual income was subject to a normal, or base, tax levied at a flat rate of one 
percent.  When income reached a certain level, an additional surtax was applied at 
progressive rates reaching as high as six percent.  The corporate income tax rate was 
explicitly tied to the individual normal tax so that a rise in the normal tax rate would be 
matched by an identical rise in the corporate tax rate.78  By exempting dividends from the 
normal tax, Congress ensured that corporate and non-corporate income was treated 
similarly.  Corporate income distributed as a dividend was subject to both the one percent 
corporate income tax and the individual surtax, if applicable, but not to the normal tax, 
while non-corporate business income was subject to both the one percent normal tax and 
the surtax, if applicable, but not to the corporate income tax.  As a result, the 1913 
75 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
76 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-81.
77 Id. at § II(B), 38 Stat. at 167-68.  
78 Id. at § II(B), (G), 38 Stat. at 166, 172 (“the normal tax hereinbefore imposed upon individuals likewise 
shall be levied, assessed, and paid annually upon the entire net income of  . . . corporations.”).  
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corporate income tax, like its predecessor under the 1894 Act, was a quasi-withholding 
provision for the individual income tax.79
Notwithstanding its use of the quasi-withholding tax structure, Congress was 
concerned with the trend toward the retention of corporate earnings.  As Senator John 
Sharp Williams, one of the primary Democratic defenders of the income tax bill in the 
Senate,80 explained, "it was thought for the purpose of obtaining revenue a corporation 
might now and then pass up a portion of its profits to surplus or otherwise refrain from 
distributing them."81  The worry was that corporations would become tax avoidance 
vehicles for high income shareholders because retained earnings were subject to the one 
percent corporate tax, but not to the surtax until distributed as dividends.82  As seen in 
Figure 3, the gap between the surtax rates and the corporate rates made the corporation a 
potential vehicle for wealthy taxpayers to park their cash and avoid the higher surtax 
rates.  
79
 As with the 1894 version, the 1913 Act did not completely eliminate the double taxation risk because
individuals, but not corporations, were entitled to an exemption of $3,000 if single or $4,000 if married.  
Id., § II(C), 38 Stat. at 168.  Thus, for a stockholder whose income fellow below the applicable exemption 
amount, the corporate income tax subjected them to a tax when they would have had to pay none if the 
income had come from a non-corporate source.  The bill's sponsors rationalized this failure to apply the 
exemption to corporate stockholders on the grounds that they enjoyed the benefits of investing through the 
corporate form.  See 50 CONG. REC. 509 (1913) (statement of Rep. Cordell Hull).  In other discussions of 
the issue, however, it was clear that part of the obstacle was the administrative difficulties in rebating their 
share of the tax.  See 50 CONG. REC. 3848 (colloquy between Senators Williams and Cummins).
80 See Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 393 (1995).
81
 50 CONG. REC. at 3774 (statement of Sen. Williams).
82 Id. at 3775 (statement of Sen. Borah) ("The very difficulty which I presume this amendment was adopted 
to meet is the fact that they might incorporate, pay the 1 per cent upon their net earnings, and entirely 
escape the graduated tax or surtax.  If there is not some way to meet that, that is precisely what may 
happen."
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Figure 3
U.S. Corporate Tax and Indivividual Surtax Rates, 1913-1935
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This concern about surtax avoidance prompted the Senate Finance Committee and the 
Democratic Caucus to tax individuals on a corporation's undivided profits.  An 
individual's "taxable income" was defined to include "the share of any taxable individual 
of the gains and profits of all companies, whether incorporated or partnership, who would 
be legally entitled to enforce the distribution or division of the same, if divided or 
distributed, whether divided or distributed or otherwise . . . ."83
83
 50 CONG. REC. 3774 (1913) (amendment introduced by Senator Williams).  The full text of the 
amendment is as follows:
For the purpose of this additional tax, taxable income shall embrace the share of any taxable 
individual of the gains and profits of all companies, whether incorporated or partnership, who 
would be legally entitled to enforce the distribution or division of the same, if dividend or 
distributed, whether divided or distributed or otherwise, and any such company, when requested 
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any district collector of internal revenue, shall 
forward to him a correct statement of such profits and the names of the individuals who would be 
entitled to the same if distributed.
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Because of its controversial nature,84 and because of certain ambiguities, the 
provision was recommitted to the Senate Finance Committee and a less expansive tax on 
undistributed earnings was proposed.85  Under this revised provision, an additional tax 
would be imposed only on companies "formed or fraudulently availed of for the purpose 
of preventing the imposition of such tax through the medium of permitting such gains and 
profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed."86  Senator Williams 
explained that the transformation of the bill was designed to be a more narrowly tailored 
solution to the problem of tax fraud:  
"This clause gave us more trouble than perhaps anything in this bill. . . . unless we 
provide for this evil in some way men might escape not the normal tax but escape 
the additional tax by merely forming themselves, or using a brother, wife, or 
somebody, or an office boy.  Then, while perfectly willing to pay the normal tax 
as a corporation, they would escape the additional tax by not having their amount 
distributed by an arrangement so that they could draw upon the corporation, of 
course, for whatever they needed.87
This compromise version was adopted by Congress and is the forerunner for the modern 
accumulated earnings tax.88  The problem of retained earnings generally, however, which 
the previous version of this provision addressed, continued to loom in the background.
2. Revenue Act of 1917
During World War I, it soon became obvious that the real threat to the surtax was 
not earnings fraudulently retained for the purpose of evading the surtax,89 but rather 
Id.
84 See Attack New Clause as Double Tax, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1913, at 5 (“Financial advisers of persons 
whose incomes are sufficiently large to make them liable for the surtax provided in the income tax bill have 
called their clients’ attention in the last few days to a clause that has been inserted by the Senate Finance 
Committee and adopted by the Democratic caucus, which has occasioned a good deal of concern and has 
been criticized as indefensible double taxation.”).
85 See 50 CONG. REC. 3774-75 (1913) (Statement of Sen. Williams) (explaining the intent to recommit the 
amendment to Committee).
86 Id. at 4380 (1913).
87 Id. at 5318 (1913) (statement of Sen. Williams).
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retained earnings generally.   According to the sketchy data available to Congress, 
corporations were retaining an average of at least fifty percent of their earnings each 
year.90  Based on aggregate corporate income amounting to approximately $9 billion 
during the 1917 fiscal year,91 Senator Andrieus Jones, a Democrat from New Mexico, 
argued that this meant that as much as $450 million in corporate income was not being 
subject to the individual surtax rates.92  Moreover, as seen in Figure 3 above, with the 
surtax rates increasing from a high of 13 percent in 1916 to a high of 50 percent in 
1917,93 the magnitude of the lost revenue had increased significantly.
Senator Jones proposed applying an accumulated earnings tax to all undistributed 
profits, not just those retained for the purpose of evading the surtax rates.  Under this 
proposal, which was originally approved by the Senate Finance Committee and reported 
out to the Senate, a surtax of 15 percent would be imposed upon undistributed corporate 
earnings.94  Additionally, corporations were granted an exemption equal to 20 percent of 
earnings, while railroads were entitled to an exemption equal to the amount the Interstate 
88
 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. 114, 166-67.  See I.R.C. § 531 (West 2002).
89
 According to several reports, the accumulated earnings tax was "a dead letter" upon passage.  See 55 
CONG. REC. 6169 (statement of Sen. Andrieus Jones) ("There is another provision of the law which was 
intended to prevent corporations from hoarding their earnings for the purpose of avoiding the payment of 
the surtax by the individual stockholders were the earnings distributed.  But the law as it exists has proven a 
dead letter."); id. at 6172 (statement of Sen. Simmons) ("I think it is generally understood that by reason of 
the terms of that provision is was not really enforced and it became a dead letter upon the statute books.").  
Part of the problem was the difficulty in determining when a retention of earnings was in excess of the 
reasonable needs of the business.  Even if Treasury could settle on an appropriate standard for establishing 
the reasonable requirements of a particular business, Senator Jones explained, this was "a task absolutely 
impossible of execution, not only as to the varied classes of business of the country but by reason of the 
enormous task of doing it.  You would have to get experts in every line of business."  Id. at 6173 (statement 
of Sen. Jones).
90 See id. at 6171 (statement of Sen. Jones) (quoting an average of the data from various sources).
91 Id. at 6167 (statement of Sen. Jones).
92 Id. at 6171 (statement of Sen. Jones).
93 Compare Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 1(b), 39 Stat. 756, 757 (imposing a top surtax rate of 13 
percent), with War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 2, 40 Stat. 300, 301 (imposing a top surtax rate of 50 
percent). 
94
 55 CONG. REC. at 5966, 6173.
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Commerce Commission determined should be retained for the purposes of extensions and 
improvements.95
As with the original 1913 Act provision, the accumulated earnings tax proposal 
was subject to "widespread criticism."96  Corporate managers protested that the tax would 
impede their efforts to expand plant capacity to meet the needs of the war effort, 
especially in a time when investment capital was limited.97  Perhaps most significantly, 
opponents argued that the trend toward more conservative dividend policies predated the 
institution of corporate income tax, and, therefore, the notion that all retained earnings 
were done so to avoid the surtax was false.  This argument proved convincing.  As 
Senator Furnifold Simmons, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, recounted:
The suggestion had been made that the retention of earnings was for the purpose 
of escaping and avoiding the income surtaxes, but it was found that before income 
taxes were imposed by our laws, before there was any possible advantage to be 
gained from such practice, it was the universal custom and practice.98
In response to this firestorm of protest, the undistributed profits tax proposal was rejected 
in favor of a 10 percent surtax that would exempt all income retained for the reasonable 
needs of the business.99  In effect, Congress simply had retreated to the admittedly 
unworkable confines of the original accumulated earnings tax.
As an alternative to the undistributed profits tax proposal, Congress chose to raise 
the corporate income tax rate two percentage points above the individual normal rates in 
95 Id.
96 Id. at 6004 (statement of Sen. Penrose).
97 Id. at 5966 (statement of Sen. Simmons) (“It was pointed out to us that under present conditions, 
differing so materially from those of the past, it was not only absolutely necessary for them as heretofore to 
retain a portion of their surplus, but that if they did not do it to a very much larger extent than under 
ordinary conditions they would be utterly unable to meet the requirements of the present war and 
emergency situation.”); See ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 141 
(1940).
98
 55 CONG. REC. 5966 (1917) (statement of Sen. Simmons).
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the War Revenue Act of 1917.100  Congress had severed the explicit link between the 
corporate and normal taxes in the Revenue Act of 1916,101 but this was a change of form 
rather than substance since both rates were set at two percent.102  As seen in Figure 4, this 
was the first time the corporate and individual normal tax rates diverged.  
Figure 4
U.S. Corporate and Normal Tax Rates, 1913 - 1935
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99 Id. at 6004 (statement of Sen. Penrose); Ware Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1206, 40 Stat. 300.  As in 
the original version, individuals would be directly subject to the surtax as if they were partners.
100 See War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300 (enacted October 3, 1917).  This was the second 
revenue measure enacted that year.  The Revenue Act of 1917, enacted exactly seven months earlier on 
March 3, 1917, imposed the first excess profits tax on corporate and partnership income.  See SIDNEY 
RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 364 (photo. reprint 1980) (1967). 
101
 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
102 Id., §§ 1, 10, 39 Stat. at 756-57, 765-66.  As part of an increase in the income tax rates to help meet 
expenses occasioned by the developing war in Europe, the income tax section was rewritten so as to 
improve the organization and clarify many of its provisions.  See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 97, at 
120.  One byproduct of this rewrite was that the corporate income tax rate was disconnected from the 
individual income tax rate.  Theoretically, this would allow the rates to move independently of each other, 
although there is no evidence that this was the motivation for the change.
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While an increase in rates was at least partly necessitated by the country’s entry into 
World War I and President Wilson’s desire to pay for the war effort on an ongoing basis 
rather than through borrowing,103 Senator Simmons explained that the divergence 
between the corporate and individual rates was designed to subject a corporation’s 
retained earnings to a surtax similar in type, if not in degree, to the one applied to 
individuals:
As it now stands in the corporation income-tax law, and as it has stood from the 
beginning, the normal tax of the individual and the normal tax, so to speak, of the 
corporation have been identically the same. . . . We [increased the corporate 
income tax rate above the normal tax on individuals] chiefly for the purpose of 
equalizing any possible difference which might exist between the individual and 
the corporation with reference to surtaxes.104
According to the calculations of Treasury officials, this two percent increase in the 
corporate income tax rate was expected to raise an additional $180 million in revenue.105
Senator Simmons noted that this “will very much more than equal the entire surtax if the 
whole amount had been distributed.”106  While Senator Jones and others disputed this 
103 See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 97, at 130.
104
 55 CONG. REC. 6172 (1917) (statement of Sen. Simmons).  See id. at 6330 (statement of Sen. Smoot) 
("the committee undertook to equalize the taxes between the partnership and the corporation by imposing 
an additional normal tax upon corporations that is not imposed upon partnerships or individuals."); Id. at 
5966 (statement of Sen. Simmons) (“Taking all these matters into consideration, your committee decided 
that the equities of the situation would be best adjusted by imposing a surtax upon such portion of the 
retained surplus that is not necessary for the reasonable requirements of the business and by making the 
corporate tax 2 per cent in excess of the normal income tax.”).  See also S. REP. No. 103, at 12, reprinted in
1939-1 C.B. 56, 68 ("Under both the House bill and existing law the normal tax of the corporation and the 
normal tax of the individual is the same.  In these conditions the earnings of the corporation escape surtax 
until distributed among its shareholders.  This situation seemed to your committee to bring about an 
inequality between the corporation and the individual which should be remedied as far as practicable. . . . 
[Y]our committee believes that the situation would be best met by imposing the surtaxes above mentioned 
upon such portions of the retained surplus as is not retained for employment in the business and by 
imposing the additional tax of 2 per cent upon the corporate incomes . . .").
105
 55 CONG. REC. at 6172.
106 Id.  See id. at 6336 (statement of Sen. Simmons) ("The committee thought that if we put upon 
corporations an additional 2 per cent tax, thereby increasing  their income tax $180,000,000, it would bring 
in the first place, into the Treasury four or five times as much money as would come to the Treasury from 
the surtax upon this 30 per cent or this 20 per cent or this 10 per cent , as the case might be, and that it 
would leave no injustice as between the corporations and the individuals, because the corporation in its 
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conclusion, both as to the amount and as to the notion that a flat rate increase would 
replicate a series of graduated surtax rates,107 the Finance Committee’s logic appeared 
sufficient to persuade a majority of Congress.  
Thus, because of the problem of retained earnings and the imposition of the 
surtax, Congress had sanctioned the divergence of the corporate and individual income 
taxes.  Some contemporary observers suggested that this development pushed the 
corporate income tax further away from its original focus on shareholder wealth.108  As 
Fred Taussig noted, because of the divergence “[t]he [corporate income] tax comes even 
more to be regarded not as one that serves to reach shareholders’ income, but one that is 
to be assimilated to other taxes, to be shifted to the general public, and to leave the 
shareholder’s income undiminished.”109
3. New Deal and the Undistributed Profits Tax110
The debate over how to tax retained earnings continued to simmer throughout the 
1920s,111 but it exploded in the early 1930s.  During this period, commentators were 
consumed with the search for possible causes of the Depression and for methods of 
entity dealing with the property of its stockholders would already have paid a much larger amount than the 
surtax would amount to if they had distribute it.").
107 Id. at 6174 (statement of Sen. Jones); id. at 6331 (statement of Sen. McCumber)(noting that while the 
corporation pays six percent and the individual partners in a partnership only four percent for the normal 
tax, the partners pay an additional thirty percent for the surtax).
108 See, e.g., F.W. Taussig, The War Tax Act of 1917, Q. J. ECON. 1, 20 (1917); Roy G. Blakey, The War 
Revenue Act of 1917, 7 AM. ECON. REV. 791, 808-09 (1917).
109
 Taussig, supra note 108, at 20.  Although Taussig is correct that the corporate income tax could not be 
considered to burden shareholders exclusively anymore, if it ever did, the notion that it could ever be 
wholly shifted to the consumer over the long-term, with little or no impact on capital or labor, is generally 
rejected.  See Jane Gravelle & Kent Smetters, Who Bears the Burden of the Corporate Tax in the Open 
Economy, NBER Working Paper Series, No. 8280, at 3 (2001); William A. Klein, The Incidence of the 
Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer's View of a Problem in Economics, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 576, 602.
110
 For a more complete discussion of the issues raised in this section, see a companion piece to this article.  
Steven A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms (unpublished manuscript, 2004) ("Norms").
111 See Bank, Scapegoat, supra note 10, at 494-506. 
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stabilizing the economy.112  One culprit immediately identified was the unreasonable 
accumulation of corporate profits.  According to a memorandum prepared by his advisors 
during then-Governor Roosevelt's campaign for the Presidency, the prosperity of the 
Twenties led to "a greater accumulation of surpluses than were ever before realized in 
economic history."113  Rather than distributing such excess profits to stockholders, 
“corporate administrators have assumed that they were private funds, capable of being 
withdrawn from personal uses and used to satisfy unrestrained ambitions for
expansion.”114  This practice of “corporate hoarding,” the memorandum charged, “upset 
the balance of production and consumption” and contributed both to the crash and the 
ensuing Depression.115
Though the memorandum's conclusions may have been suspect,116 many shared 
its view that retained earnings were a serious problem.117  During the debates over the 
112 See, e.g., Marriner S. Eccles, Controlling Booms and Depressions, in ECONOMIC BALANCE AND A 
BALANCED BUDGET 69 (Rudolph L. Weissman, ed., 1940); ELEANOR LANSING DULLES, DEPRESSION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION:  A STUDY OF CAUSES AND CONTROLS (1936); LEONARD P. AYRES, THE 
ECONOMICS OF RECOVERY (1933); PAUL EINZIG, THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS, 1929-1931 (1931); 
R.T. Ely, Real Estate in the Business Cycle, 22 AM. ECON. REV. 137, 138 (1932); William W. 
Cumberland, Factors Operating Toward Recovery from Depression, 5 J. OF BUS. OF THE UNIV. OF 
CHICAGO 114 (1932).
113
 Memorandum of May 19, 1932 of Raymond Moley and others for Franklin Delano Roosevelt outlining 
national program for recovery in Box 282, Folder 3, Raymond Moley Papers, Hoover Institution Library 
and Archives, Stanford University.  The May 19 memorandum was written in response to a request by 
Roosevelt to keep him updated during his pre-campaign vacation trip to Warm Springs.  The memorandum 
provided the opportunity to prepare a series of specific recommendations for various aspects of the 
economic crisis and was the foundation of many of Roosevelt’s campaign speeches and eventually his 
acceptance speech.  See RAYMOND MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS 21-22 (1939); DANIEL R. FUSFELD, THE 
ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW DEAL 219 (1954).  
Many, if not most, of the memorandum’s recommendations were eventually enacted into law.
114
 Memorandum of May 19, 1932, supra note 113, at 4.
115 Id. at 2-3.  The theory was that profits, which might have been distributed to shareholders or paid to 
employees and made available for consumption, were instead left idle.  To combat the overcapacity 
problem, companies closed plants and prices rose (because the company had to spread the overhead costs 
over fewer products) while workers went unemployed and shareholders failed to see a return on their 
investment.  Furthermore, managers’ investment of liquid surplus in the market enhanced volatility as 
managers quickly withdrew money and parked it in short-term securities or in savings accounts.  Id. 
116 See Bank, Agency Costs, supra note 23, at 185 n. 85.
117 Id. at 185, n. 86.
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Revenue Act of 1932,118 Representative McFadden went beyond the undistributed profits 
tax to propose a tax on accumulated surplus itself.119  According to McFadden, "[t]hese 
accumulated profits would have paid taxes to a far greater amount if they had been 
distributed as dividends when they were earned.  If they had been so distributed, we 
might not have come to the depths in which we find ourselves to-day."120  While this 
proposal received little support, there was substantial concern about retained earnings and 
the leakage inherent in the accumulated earnings tax.121
   The post-Crash concern for retained earnings went beyond the tax policy 
motivations for earlier attempts at an undistributed profits tax.  Roosevelt and his advisers 
were concerned about the misallocation of economic resources.  Rex Tugwell, a member 
of Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust” and a Columbia economics professor,122 argued that because 
of managerial control over retained earnings, corporations “grow overconfident of the 
future and expand their own activities beyond all reason.”123  This dovetailed nicely with 
fellow Brain Truster Adolf Berle's conclusion that because of a growing separation 
between ownership and control managers increasingly became interested in using 
retained earnings to fund expansions plans or further their own job security, rather than to 
support dividends to stockholders.124  Tugwell suggested that government needed to 
“drive corporate surpluses into the open investment market” and out of the hands of 
118
 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 11, 47 Stat. 174.  Congress actually cut the gap in half when it raised 
the individual normal rate from four to eight percent, see id. at § 13, 47 Stat. 177, but it soon reversed itself 
in the Revenue Act of 1934 when the normal tax was reduced to its original four percent.  Revenue Act of 
1934, ch. 277, §§ 11, 13, 48 Stat. 684, 686.
119
 75 CONG. REC. 6341 (1932) (statement of Rep. McFadden) (the proposed tax would be 4 percent).
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 6478 (1932) (statement of Rep. Frear); id. at 6483 (statement of Rep. Blanton).
122 See FUSFELD, supra note 113, at 207-10.  The other key academics in the Brain Trust were Adolf Berle 
and Raymond Moley.  Id.
123 REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE AND THE GOVERNMENTAL ARTS 205 (1933).
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managers through “a tax . . . imposed on funds, over and above replacement, which are 
kept for expansion purposes.”125  Tugwell and other Brain Trusters had made the same 
point in the May 19th memorandum to Roosevelt, recommending a “tax on undistributed 
surplus income of corporations” in order to break the cycle of overproduction and under 
consumption.126  These and other ideas clearly made an impression on Roosevelt.127  In 
his July 1932 acceptance speech at the Democratic national convention, Roosevelt 
attributed the Depression to heavy “corporate surpluses” used to finance “unnecessary 
plants” and rampant pre-Crash stock market speculations.128
While Roosevelt did not immediately take action against retained earnings upon 
becoming President,129 the undistributed profits tax notion resurfaced a few years later
amidst a budgetary crisis.  The Supreme Court’s striking down of the processing taxes 
funding the Agricultural Adjustment Act and Congress’ overriding of a presidential veto 
to accelerate payment of bonuses to World War I veterans created two gaping holes in the 
budget.130 Roosevelt turned to the undistributed profits tax to fill the holes.  In a 
124 BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra note 39, at 349-50.  For a discussion of this agency cost problem, see supra
text accompanying notes 261-66.
125 TUGWELL, supra note 123, at 206.
126
 Memorandum of May 19, 1932, supra note 113, at 4.
127
 Other rationales forwarded in favor of an undistributed profits tax included the stabilization of the 
economy and the destruction of monopoly.  See JOHN MORTON BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES:  
YEARS OF CRISIS, 1928-1938 307 (1959); Robert H. Jackson, The Proposed Revision of Corporation Taxes, 
2 VITAL SPEECHES 431, 432 (1936) (arguing that "antiquated tax laws" permitted corporate managers to use 
surpluses "to finance monopolistic practices.").
128 July 2, 1932 Speech in I THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 651 (Samuel 
I. Rosenmann, ed. 1932); ALFRED G. BUEHLER, THE UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX 18 (1937).
129
 This was in part because Roosevelt was worried that an undistributed profits tax might arouse sufficient 
opposition to threaten his other New Deal programs.  See W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspectives on 
U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?  THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE 
RICH 29, 51 (2000).  
130 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 111 (1936) (holding that the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
“invades the reserved rights of the states.  It is a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural 
production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government.  The tax, the appropriation of 
the funds raised and the direction for their disbursement, are but parts of the plan.  They are but means to an 
unconstitutional end.”); Revenue Act of 1936:  Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the Sen. Comm. on Fin., 74th
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supplemental budget message to Congress on March 3, 1936, Roosevelt suggested 
Congress make up the $620 million shortfall by replacing the corporate income tax with 
an undistributed profits tax.  According to Roosevelt, “[a] proper tax on corporate income 
. . . which is not distributed as earned , would correct the serious twofold inequity in our 
taxes on business profits” by forcing corporations to distribute profits to their 
shareholders where they would be subject to the same high surtax rates as partnerships 
and sole proprietorships.131  Most significantly, Roosevelt’s proposal would completely 
exempt distributed income from double taxation because the repeal of the corporate 
income tax would be accompanied by a repeal of the exemption from dividends from the 
normal tax on individuals.132  This would ensure that distributed income would be subject 
to one layer of tax, but no more than one layer.133
Managers soon mounted a fierce opposition to Roosevelt’s proposal.  While 
managers had opposed previous attempts to impose an undistributed profits tax during the 
first decade of the income tax, those proposals generally arose from the concern of one 
senator – Senator Andrieus Jones – and did not have the support of the Administration or, 
in most cases, Treasury.  Moreover, the emergence of the New Deal and Roosevelt’s 
popularity, achieved to some extent at the expense of business, had raised the stakes.  
Thus, both directly and through lobbying organizations that they effectively controlled 
during the period such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1936) (“1936 House Hearings”) (statement of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the 
Treasury) (identifying the two budgetary concerns necessitating the undistributed profits tax proposal).
131 A Supplemental Budget Message to Congress (March 3, 1936), in 5 T HE PUBLIC PAPERS AND 
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 128, at 105.
132 Id. at 106. 
133
 Undistributed income would be subject to double taxation because of the application of the undistributed 
profits tax and the individual normal tax.
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Chamber of Commerce,134 corporate managers appeared in force during the hearings in 
the House Ways and Means Committee on a bill to enact Roosevelt’s proposal.135  While 
they claimed to be concerned with the effect of the proposal on small business,136 many 
of their comments suggested that their underlying concern was the potential interference 
with the decisions of corporate managers and boards of directors.  Enacting an 
undistributed profits tax, G.L. Walters of the Illinois Manufacturing Association 
complained, would “take from business management one of the most essential matters of 
management involved in business.  Government would just as well take away from all 
those who have the responsibility of driving automobiles their control over the brakes, the 
clutch, the throttle, or the steering wheel.”137  Most seriously, Fred Clausen of the United 
States Chamber of Commerce worried that the undistributed profits tax “would engender 
134 See MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM:  THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933-1939
244 (1984) (“To some extent, this unity [of the business community in opposition to the tax] reflected the 
dominance of giant corporations in industrial associations.”).  For instance, while the National Association 
of Manufacturers nominally represented a broad cross-section of industry, large corporations dominated its 
decision-making body throughout the New Deal and the World War II period.  See Philip H. Burch, Jr., The 
NAM as an Interest Group, 4 POL. & SOC’Y 97, 103 (Fall 1973) (“Throughout the New Deal-World War II 
years and average of about sixty-five to seventy percent of the membership of the executive committee was 
composed of representatives of big industrial concerns, and in some years eighty percent or more of these 
important figures was drawn from such select business circles.”); Alfred S. Cleveland, NAM:  Spokesman 
for Industry?, HARV. BUS. REV. 353, 365 (May 1948) (“the identity of the inner policy-making group 
indicates that active leadership within the NAM comes primarily from among the very largest 
manufacturing corporations”); Richard W. Gable, NAM:  Influential Lobby or Kiss of Death?, 15 J. POL. 
254, 259, 260 (1953) (“In practice, therefore, the board has constitutionally unlimited power in making all 
policy decisions.  This group has been heavily weighted in favor of an active minority which represents 
conservative, big businesses and which is an unrepresentative sample of NAM members in terms of size, 
wealth, and number of employees. . . . Between 1933 and 1937 a total of almost $4 million was collected.  
A group of 262 companies – among the largest and most powerful in the nation – supplied almost 50 per 
cent of that total.”); Richard Walter Gable, A Political Analysis of an Employers’ Association:  The 
National Association of Manufacturers 242-43 (1950) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of 
Chicago) (on file with The University of Chicago library) (“in terms of corporate size and number of 
employees, the leadership of the Association since 1933 has not been, on the whole, reflective of NAM 
members, much less of American industry”). 
135
 While the small, undercapitalized businesses, which were most likely to be affected by the tax, also were 
active opponents of the bill, corporations with professional managers led the charge.
136 See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 130, at 352 (statement of G.L. Walters, Illinois Manufacturing 
Association).
137 Id. at 339. 
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such uncertainties concerning the sound course to pursue as to subject the management to 
grave difficulties with shareholders and creditors.”138
The opposition was unsuccessful as the bill emerged from Committee unscathed 
and passed in the House with surprisingly little dissent.139  Under the bill, the corporate 
income tax would be replaced by an undistributed profits tax graduated according to the 
percentage of net income retained.140  For corporations with an annual net income of 
$10,000 or less, the rates ranged from 1% on the first 10% of undistributed net income to 
29.7% on undistributed net income of 70.3% or more.141  For corporations with annual 
income in excess of $10,000, the bill proposed rates ranging from 4% on the first 10% of 
undistributed net income to a maximum of 42.5% on undistributed net income of 57.5% 
or more.142
Republicans changed their strategy in the Senate, choosing both to oppose the 
undistributed profits tax and to seek to limit its force.  To reduce the bill’s exclusive 
reliance on the undistributed profits tax, opponents questioned its revenue-raising ability 
and harped on its lack of a track record of success.  M.L. Seidman of the New York 
Board of Trade summarized these concerns:  “At a time like the present, when the need 
for revenue is so great, when we are spending so much more than what we are taking on, 
138 Id. at 739-40 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, Chairman of the Committee on Federal Finance, Chamber 
of Commerce of the United States).
139 See $803,000,000 Tax Bill Wins by Vote of 267-93 in House; Business Attacks New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 1936, at 1.  Republican opposition was considered “perfunctory” and the chamber called 
“indifferent” to their pleas.  See Turner Catledge, House Democrats Wind Up Tax Bill; Final Vote Today, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1936, at 1 (calling the proceedings “the most perfunctory witnessed in the House on 
an important measure in many years.”); Editorial, On the Senate’s Lap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1936, at 18 
(“After little debate worthy of the name, conducted for the most part before an indifferent chamber whose 
seats were less than one-quarter filled” the House passed the measure).  This was due in part to 
Republican’s decision to make “campaign material” out of the tax bill rather than attempt to lessen its 
impact through amendments.  See Republicans Bar Tax Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1936, at 12.
140 1936 House Hearings, supra note 130, at 5.  
141 Id. at 5-6.
142 Id. at 6.
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when business is recuperating from the worst depression in our history, and when 
industry is so sensitive to every disturbing influence, how can we possibly afford to 
gamble such a vast sum of know public revenue for what is so much an adventure into 
the wilderness?”143  These arguments served to reinforce the criticism that the tax was 
just a thinly veiled attempt to control corporate governance and drive a wedge between 
managers and their stockholders.144
The attack on Treasury's revenue projections proved fatal to the House bill's all-
or-nothing strategy, but did not defeat the undistributed profits tax altogether.  Thus, a 
group of nine Democrats on the Senate Finance Committee joined the Republican 
minority to announce an alternate revenue proposal.145  Under the proposal, which was 
prepared with the substantial assistance of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its 
representatives,146 the undistributed profits tax would assume a greatly reduced role.  In 
its place, the Senators planned to raise the corporate income tax from the current top rate 
143 Id. at 93 (statement of M.L. Seidman, Chairman, Tax Committee, New York Board of Trade).  See
Revenue Act of 1936:  Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the Sen. Comm. On Fin., 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 679, 
682 (1936) ("1936 Senate Hearings") (statement of James A. Emery, general counsel, National Association 
of Manufacturers) (“it is not . . . a reliable source of revenue, for it is subject to the variations of business 
policy rather than the net income of the business itself.”).  See also id. at 220, 221 (statement of Fred H. 
Clausen, United States Chamber of Commerce) (“The added revenue to be derived is highly uncertain and 
insufficient.  It is less than the budgeted increase in ordinary expenditures for the next fiscal year.”).
  This theme was also emphasized in the popular press.  See, e.g., Taxing and Destroying, BUS. WEEK, May 
9, 1936, at 48 (“Nobody knows how much revenue the bill would actually produce; it might be less than the 
billion dollars obtainable by the present taxes, which the bill would recklessly abolish. . . . If the things 
nobody knows about this bill were laid end to end, they would constitute an aggregate of ignorance as 
enormous and formidable as American statesmanship has ever been able to boast.”).
144
 Editorial, Punishing Prudence, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1936, at 22 (“[i]t has become increasingly 
obvious that in the eyes of most of its sponsors the proposed tax on corporation surpluses is not primarily a 
revenue measure, but a new economic ‘reform.’”); 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 143, at 520 
(statement of Herman H. Lind, National Machine-Tool Builders Association) (“[t]he determination of 
dividend policy within an individual company will bring to the fore conflicts among various types of 
stockholders.  A very different interest in the amount of earnings to be distributed will be found between 
stockholders of large incomes and those of small incomes – between those engaged in the management of a 
business and those who are purely investors.”); id. at 722, 724 (statement of H.W. Story, Allis-Chalmers 
Manufacturing Co.) (“the normal pressure on management by stockholders for the payment of larger 
dividends” would grow, making it “more difficult for management to pursue a conservative policy of 
utilizing a large proportion of its earnings for the purpose of promoting the growth of the company.”).
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of 15% to rates ranging from 17.5% to 20% and to eliminate the exemption from the 
normal tax for dividends.147  The undistributed profits tax would remain a part of the bill 
only as a “temporary” tax for three years.148
A second proposed alternative emerged that made the tradeoff between double 
taxation and the undistributed profits tax even starker.  Originally set forth in a New York
Times editorial, this proposal provided that the existing tax on corporate incomes would 
be retained, but at a flat rate of 15% rather than the graduated rates ranging from 12.5% 
to 15%.149  In addition, the proposal would eliminate the exemption from the 4% normal 
tax on dividends paid to individuals and would impose a 4% undistributed profits tax.150
The identity of rates between the dividend tax and the undistributed profits tax was no 
mere coincidence.  As the Times acknowledged, “[s]uch a tax should raise substantial 
revenue at the same time as it would be likely to have very little effect on dividend 
policy, for it would penalize even the relatively low-incomed stockholders no more to 
retain these profits than to pay them out.”151  Senator William King, a Democrat from 
Utah, thought the concept worthy enough that he entered the editorial into the records
during the Hearings.152
This latter proposal eventually won out in the Senate Finance Committee, 
although a late push by Committee Chair Pat Harrison helped restore a modicum of 
145 See Senate Group Plans Complete Tax Bill Revision, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1936, at 1.
146 Id. at 2.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149
 Editorial, A Compromise Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1936, at 18.
150 Id.  The American Institute of Accountants simply suggested that the undistributed profits tax be applied 
at a “low rate.”  1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 143, at 603.
151 Id. 
152 See id., at 352 (statement of Sen. King) (“I should like to insert in the record an editorial that the New 
York Times has in hits morning’s issue, a very excellent editorial, and by that I do not mean to give my 
approval to it in all respects, as to the terms of a bill.”).
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substance to the undistributed profits tax.  As finally passed by the Senate, the 
undistributed profits tax was set at 7% and dividends were subject to the 4% normal tax 
on individuals.153  While business still grumbled about the introduction of even the 
principle of an undistributed profits tax,154 they had substantially blunted the plan's 
distributive pressure.  The bill was also a far cry from the 42.5% rate passed by the 
House.
In part because of the substantial gap between the House and Senate bills, it was 
not surprising that the Conference Committee arrived at a compromise satisfactory to no 
one.    As finally adopted, the Revenue Act of 1936 imposed a surtax on the 
“undistributed net income” of corporations at rates ranging from 7% to 27%.155  In 
addition to imposing this surtax on undistributed profits, the 1936 Act retained the normal 
corporate income tax, with rates ranging from 8% to 15%,156 and removed the exemption 
from the 4% normal individual tax for dividends received.157  The result was the 
imposition of a full two layers of tax on corporate income, in addition to the surtax, 
whereas income from other sources was only subject to one layer of tax, in addition to the 
surtax.  Because of the increase in the highest undistributed profits tax rate from 7% in 
the Senate bill to 27% in the final Act, however, this additional 4% normal tax on 
dividends did not appear to offer much resistance to the push to distribute earnings.  The 
net penalty on retained earnings was still a quite hefty 24% at the highest marginal rates.
153 See Turner Catledge, 18% Corporate Income Tax and 7% on Undivided Profit Agreed on by Senate 
Group, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1936, at 1.
154 See Turner Catledge, New Tax Program is Held Adequate by the Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1936, 
at 1, 27 (describing a U.S. Chamber of Commerce statement objecting the proposal).   
155
 Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1655.
156 Id. at § 13(b), 49 Stat. at 1655.
157 Id. at § 11, 49 Stat. at 1653.
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Although seemingly one-sided, this compromise was structured so as to minimize 
the coercive force of the undistributed profits tax.  The top rate on the undistributed 
profits tax was identical to the lowest surtax rate for incomes in excess of $44,000.158
This may have been designed to subject corporate income to the same tax – whether it 
was retained or distributed – assuming the shareholder’s income fell within this surtax 
bracket.  Application of the 4% normal tax on dividends, therefore, ensured that 
permitting the corporation to retain profits rather than subjecting them to an additional 
tax was still logical to that class of shareholders.159  Only those shareholders not subject 
to any surtax – who were presumably the least powerful equity holders – were still likely 
to clamor for distributions as a result of the ultimately enacted undistributed profits tax.
Double taxation emerged because Congress recognized that undistributed profits 
avoided the high individual surtax rates and because managers pushed for a solution that 
would preserve their discretion to retain earnings.  After the passage of the Revenue Act 
of 1936, business opposition to the undistributed profits tax continued.  John Morton 
Blum recounted that, “[b]ecause that tax tended to return to stockholders the decision 
about how to spend or invest their money, it challenged the power of professional 
managers of large corporations.  These managers, their lawyers, and accountants, in all an 
able, articulate, and influential group, were aggressive opponents of the tax.”160  Business 
leaders seized on the recession in the late summer of 1937 as an opportunity to blame the 
undistributed profits tax for a whole assortment of economic ills.161  Eventually, this 
158 See Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 101, 49 Stat. 1014 (1935) (both were set at 27%).
159
 Of course, if the corporation retained the profits and became subject to the tax, the shareholder would 
eventually be subject to a heavy tax upon distribution.  If no distribution was ever made, however, the 
shareholder could recoup his profits in the form of capital gains upon sale of the stock.
160 BLUM, supra note 127, at 321.  
161 Profits Tax Slows Recovery, He Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1937, at 20 (blamed for decline of retail 
credit); Levy on Profits Halts Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1937, at 24 (blamed for delay and 
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proved successful, especially when business began to point to the undistributed profits 
tax as the principal cause of a crisis in business confidence.162  In the Revenue Act of 
1938,163 business leaders once again traded higher corporate rates and double taxation for 
the nullification of the undistributed profits tax.  Thus, the corporate income tax rate was 
increased to 19% with a 2.5% credit available to companies that distributed all of their 
earnings.164  As in the 1936 Act, dividends were subject to the normal tax on individuals.  
To appease corporate managers who feared that the maintenance of even a symbolic 
undistributed profits tax would allow it to come back from the dead at a later date,165
Congress agreed that the credit for distributed earnings would expire in two years.166
Managers made little attempt to revive the dividend exemption after this point, choosing 
termination of expansion plans); 15 Criticisms Made of the Profit Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1937, at 24 
(U.S. Chamber of Commerce study); Surplus Tax Repeal Held Labor Benefit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1937, § 
III, at 8 (National Association of Manufacturers Study); Editorial, A Tax Theory Demolished, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 22, 1937, at 4; Our Taxes Too High, Periling Business, Tremaine Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1937, at 
1 (“[New York State Controller] Tremaine blamed the stock market slump directly upon the Federal 
Capital Gains and Losses Tax, and the Undistributed Profits Tax.”); Ballantine Finds New Deal Harmful, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1937, at 10 (highlighting the undistributed profits tax among New Deal programs “as 
responsible for the current stock market slump”).
162 See WALTER LAMBERT, THE NEW DEAL REVENUE ACTS:  THE POLITICS OF TAXATION 414 (1970).
163
 Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447.  
164 Id. at § 13(c), 52 Stat. at 455.  See Business Tax Aids Retained in New Compromise Bill, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 23, 1938, at 1; Tax Revision Bill Conferees Adopt Compromise Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1938, 
at 3.
165 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1938:  Hearing on H.R. 9682 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 75th Cong., 
pt. 2 183 (1938) (statement of J.W. Hooper, Chairman of the Federal Tax Committee, Brooklyn Chamber 
of Commerce) (warning that the retention of the undistributed profits tax principle would make it “an ever-
constant threat); id. at 257 (statement of M.L. Seidman, Chairman of Taxation Committee, New York 
Board of Trade) (“it would remain to haunt business, not only for what it is, but also for what it may 
eventually grow into if permitted to remain as a permanent part of our tax structure.”); id. at 469 (statement 
of Ellsworth Alvord, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (“if you impose 3½ percent this year . . . what is there to 
assure a businessmen that you will not boost that penalty to 42½ percent as was proposed two years ago?”).
166 Modified Surplus Tax for Two Years Retained in Senate-House Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
1938, at 1.  By this time, even Treasury officials opposed continuing the tax.  According to Treasury 
Secretary Morgenthau, it had become one of the system’s “tax irritants.”  Revenue Revision – 1939:  
Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways & Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1939) (statement of 
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury).
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instead to focus on a business tax aid program that would increase managers’ flexibility 
and independence.167
B. U.K.
Unlike in the U.S., the British corporate income tax did not develop into the 
classical corporate income tax in the first half of the twentieth century.  While there were 
several wartime measures that imposed a form of economic double taxation on corporate 
income, they were short-lived and quite unpopular.  The underlying impetus for the 
separation of the corporate and individual income taxes in the U.S. -- retained earnings --
did not rise to the same level in the U.K during this period.
1. 1918
During World War I, the Income Tax Act of 1842 was consolidated with all 
succeeding modifications of the system in the Income Tax Act of 1918.168  The principle 
provision governing the taxation of corporate income was contained in General Rule 20.  
Under this provision, the 1842 version of the corporate income tax scheme was adopted 
with only mild changes in phrasing.169  Thus, the shareholder imputation system survived 
167 See Congress Leaders Plan to Expedite Tax Aid Legislation, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1939, at 1; Leaders 
to Push Business Tax Aid at Present Session, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1939, at 1.  Under this program, 
business would receive four major tax benefits:  (1) Replace the undistributed profits tax and corporate 
income tax at rates ranging from 16.5% to 19% with a flat 18% corporate income tax; (2) Permit an annual 
revaluation of capital stock for purposes of the capital stock tax; (3) Eliminate the limit on capital loss 
deductions for corporations; and (4) Permit corporations to carryforward losses for two or three years.  
Alfred F. Flynn, Four Point Plan for Tax Revision Being Considered, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1939, at 1.  
The latter provision was eventually extended to individuals and partnerships in the final House bill.  See 
Two New Concessions to Business Included in House Tax Bill, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1939, at 1; House 
Passes Tax Revision Bill; Approval by Senate Likely, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1939, at 2.
168
 Income Tax Act of 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. ch. 40.
169
 Id. at General Rule 20:
The profits and gains to be charged on any body of persons shall be computed in accordance with 
the provisions of this Act on the full amount of the same before any dividend thereof is made in 
respect of any share, right, or title thereto, and the body of persons paying such dividend shall be 
entitled to deduct the tax appropriate thereto
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the consolidation.  Corporations were subject to tax on their income, but to compensate 
them for paying this tax, they were entitled to deduct from any dividends an amount 
equal to the proportionate share of the tax paid at the corporate level.  Shareholders then 
received a credit to reflect the fact that tax had already been paid at the corporate level on 
any dividend income.
The major innovation to the British income tax system between 1842 and 1918 
was the introduction of the principle of direct graduation to the income taxes for the year 
1909-10.170  Under the Finance Act of 1910,171 a super-tax of 2.5 percent was applied to 
the regular income tax of just under 6 percent for incomes in excess of £3,000,172 but not 
to the withholding at the source scheme.  Corporations paid tax at the standard rate and 
shareholders received a credit against the standard rate for tax paid at the corporate level 
on dividends.  Dividends, however, were still subject to the super-tax in the hands of 
shareholders when applicable. 
Theoretically, the introduction of a progressive super-tax to the British income 
tax, which was eventually replaced by a surtax,173 should have had the same effect on the 
corporate income tax as it did in the U.S.  When income was only subject to a flat rate, a 
shareholder imputation system assured that it was subject to that rate when earned at the 
corporate level.  Under these circumstances, the decision to distribute profits as dividends 
was of little consequence to the government.  Now that some shareholders were subject 
170
 The principal of graduation was introduced indirectly starting in 1853 with the use of abatements, but 
this was found to be impractical for reaching higher incomes without completely exempting lower incomes.  
See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE INCOME TAX, Cmd. 615 at 28 (1920) (hereinafter "1920 
ROYAL COMMISSION").  
171
 Finance Act of 1910, § 66.
172 See 1920 ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 170, at 123.  The actual percentage for the standard rate on 
the income tax was 14d or 5.83 percent.  Id.
173 See ROSWELL MAGILL ET AL., A SUMMARY OF THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 24-25 (1934) (prepared for the 
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation).
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to a progressive rate, though, a decision not to distribute profits as a dividend could 
deprive the government of super-tax revenues.  
While this retained earnings problem led the U.S. Congress to raise the corporate 
rate above the standard individual rate and thereby gradually disconnect the corporate and 
individual income taxes,174 there was no similar reaction in the U.K.  Some shareholders 
did try to avoid the super-tax by arguing that General Rule 20 removed dividend income 
from the taxable income of the shareholder altogether, but the courts rejected such 
arguments.175  There was no immediate attempt to respond to the potential retained 
earnings problem via across-the-board legislation along the lines of the U.S. Revenue Act 
of 1917.  The implication is that retained earnings were not yet the significant factor that 
they had become in America.
2. Corporation Profits Tax - 1920-24  
The first sign of a chink in the shareholder imputation system’s armor in the U.K. 
was the adoption of the Corporation Profits Tax in 1920.176  Although Parliament had 
enacted an Excess Profits tax at the onset of World War I in 1915,177 this levy was 
applicable to the profits of all business.178  When the war ended, however, and the 
government sought to reclaim the lingering stream of war profits, it limited its focus to 
corporations.  The tax operated as an additional 5 percent tax on corporate income, even 
174 See supra Part II.A.
175 See, e.g., Brooke v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 1 K.B. 257, 7 Tax Cases 261 (1918); Whitney v. 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, A.C. 37, 10 Tax Cases 88 (1926).  Such challenges may have been due 
in part to the confusion caused by the practice of issuing dividends "free of tax" so that a £10 dividend, less 
£3 deduction for the corporation's income tax would be issued as a £7 dividend "free of tax."  See 1920 
ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 170, at 39 ("It has also been urged that the system leads to confusion in 
the taxpayer's mind, because it is frequently difficult to convince him that in making a return of his total 
income (e.g., for Super-tax purposes) the amount he must show as his income from a 'free of tax' dividend
is more than the actual net amount he has received.").  
176
 Finance Act of 1920, § 52.
177
 Finance (No. 2) Act of 1915, §§ 38-45.
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though it was styled as a separate form of tax.179  This appeared to be a shift to the 
American system because it treated the corporation as a separate taxable entity.180
  Despite the apparent paradigm shift, the corporation profits tax did not signify a 
true departure from the pass-through nature of the shareholder imputation system.  The 
decision to limit the profits tax to corporations was in part a reaction to the widespread 
criticism levied against the excess profits duty, which applied to all businesses, and 
business' preference to it over other alternatives such as a sales tax or a tax on all 
capital.181  It was also easy to justify as remedy for the inequity between corporations and 
partnerships as to the supertax.182  Perhaps to underscore the limited significance of the 
measure, the Inland Revenue report recommending a corporation profits tax did so under 
the explicit assumption that the government would soon revert to the former system of 
taxing corporations.183  As soon as the economy recovered sufficiently so as to produce a 
surplus, the rate was cut in half in 1923 -- to 2.5 percent -- and then repealed the 
following year.184
3. 1924-1937
After the repeal of the corporation profits tax, the British reverted to their prewar 
scheme.  Unlike in the U.S. where the wartime measures only strengthened the growing 
separation between the corporate and individual income taxes, the British experiment 
178 See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 78 (the rate rose from 15% in 1915 to 80% in 1918).
179 See HARRISON B. SPAULDING, THE INCOME TAX IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 87 (1927).
180 See DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 89.
181 Id. at 90-92.
182
 This is based on the same argument raised in the U.S. context.  Corporate income was subject to the 
standard rate when earned and, when distributed, to the supertax.  Partnership income was subject to both 
the standard rate and the supertax when earned, regardless of when the money was distributed.  Id. at 91.
183 Id. at 91.
184 Id. at 93.  See Finance Act of 1924, § 34.
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with the profits tax appeared to have little influence on contemporary views about the 
taxation of corporate income.185  For example, in 1927, one observer wrote 
Corporations, except for convenience of collection of the tax, are not treated as 
taxable entities.  The underlying theory is that the income tax is to be imposed 
only on individuals and in accordance with their taxable capacity. . . . A 
corporation is regarded as merely as a device by means of which a number of 
individuals can conveniently do business, and it is not looked upon as a separate 
object of taxation.  It is not in itself a potentially taxable person, but is an 
aggregation of persons who may or may not be taxable.  It is necessary for some 
purposes that corporations be regarded as separate legal entities, but the British do 
not extend this conception to the field of income tax.186
By contrast, the fact that U.S. corporations paid tax at a rate higher than the normal rate 
and shareholders could not recover the difference between the normal and corporate rates 
was considered a much more significant sign of a separate entity system.187
There were some signs that the shareholder imputation system was weakening 
after the repeal of the Corporation Profits Tax, but these were more akin to minor 
adjustments than the separation of the corporate and individual income taxes that was 
occurring in the U.S.  For example, in 1927 Parliament clarified one potential ambiguity 
in the withholding at the source scheme by providing that the corporation's right to 
deduct from a dividend was based on the corporate tax rate in the year of distribution 
rather than the corporate tax rate actually imposed on the distributed profits.188  Thus, if a 
corporation paid income tax on its profits at one rate and then distributed those profits in 
a subsequent year in which a higher rate was in effect, it would withhold from the 
dividend an amount based on the higher rate even though it had actually paid at the lower 
185 Id. at 93 ("Corporate taxation did not have a purchase in British fiscal policy, for it contradicted the 
assumption that firms were agents rather than taxable entities.  Corporation taxation did not, as in the 
United States, connect with hostility to big business or with opposition to a federal income tax.").
186 SPAULDING, supra note 179, at 86-87.
187 See id. at 35.
188
 Finance Act of 1927, § 39.
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rate.189  While this meant that the deduction was not strictly tied to the amount of tax 
actually paid, it only enacted what was already imposed in practice on the grounds of 
administrative simplicity.190
British reaction to the U.S. controversy over imposition of an undistributed profits 
tax in 1936 only confirms the large gulf in the two countries' attitudes toward the 
corporate tax.  Newspapers reported the substantial negative effect the undistributed 
profits tax appeared to be having on business confidence,191 but British business 
representatives were not entirely sympathetic.  The president of the Society of 
Incorporated Accountants, Walter Holman, observed that "[t]he taxation of undistributed 
profits seemed particularly hard to Americans who had not previously been subjected to 
the process of taxing profits at the source, so that the accumulation of undivided profits 
became increasingly difficult."192  Holman suggested that the problem was partly the 
result of an "inclination to speculation which was part of the makeup of the American 
temperament."193  He explained, "the extension of the taxation of capital profits was a 
hard blow to a people brought up to invest more for capital increase than for immediate 
189 See 1936 INCOME TAX CODIFICATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 64.  While this meant that 
the corporation could actually profit from the deal by withholding more from than the dividend than was 
necessary to compensate it for the tax paid on the underlying profits, the converse was also true and 
corporations would not be made whole if the tax rate dropped between the year tax was paid on the profits
and the year in which those profits were distributed as dividends.  See H. Arnold Strangman, British and 
American Taxes, 21 TAXES 207, 208 (1943). 
190 Id.
191 See, e.g., The Wall Street Slump, TIMES (London), May 4, 1936, at 23 ("The largest single factor perhaps 
in the change of sentiment reflected in the fall of stock prices has been the proposal, and now the passing 
by a great majority in the House of Representatives, of the Administration's new Taxation Bill.  That Bill . . 
. is regarded generally by Business as an enormous obstacle in the road to recovery."); Heavy Spending in 
America; Effect of New Tax Law, TIMES (London), Nov. 16, 1936, at 21 ("The endorsement of the 'New 
Deal' by the electorate at the polls has by no means effected a miraculous reformation in the spirit of 
corporations.  They are quite as desirous as they ever were to conserve their assets and build up 
comfortable surpluses for a rainy day . . ."); President and the U.S. "Slump," TIMES (London), Nov. 15, 
1937, at 22 ("Revision of that tax [the undistributed profits tax] -- and of the Capital Gains Tax, too, if that 
were not too much to hope for -- seems to most business men the most hopeful way of curtailing this 
present depression . . ."). 
192
"Penal" Taxation in the United States, TIMES (London), Dec. 17, 1937, at 11.
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income."194  Since the British were used to a relatively free flow of dividends as the 
primary source of return on their investment, the implication was that the undistributed 
profits tax would not have produced the same malaise among businesses in the U.K.
Thus, the British maintained the shareholder imputation approach to corporate 
income taxation as the U.S. was abandoning the dividend exemption in favor of full 
double taxation.  This divergence was a product of the growing divergence in the 
dividend policies of corporations in the two countries.  In the U.K., companies continued 
to distribute a high percentage of their profits as dividends each year, while in the U.S. 
the trend toward more retained earnings took hold around the turn-of-the-century, prior to 
the adoption of an income tax.  This difference in corporate finance necessitated a change 
in approach by U.S. tax authorities and set in motion a sequence of events that led to the 
adoption of the classical corporate income tax.  By contrast, prior to World War II, the 
U.K. felt no push to alter its traditional shareholder-focused corporate income tax 
scheme.
III. The Continuing Influence of Firm Dividend Policy on the Evolution of the U.S. 
and British Systems
During the post-World War II era, there is some evidence that companies in the 
U.S. and the U.K. have continued to differ on the question of dividend policy.  Studies 
have found that while dividends among U.S. companies dropped to their lowest levels 
193 Id.
194 Id.
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ever in the late 1990s,195 dividends among British companies rose during the same 
period.196 While there is evidence suggesting that the reverse was true for much of the 
preceding years,197 the more important point is that legislatures in the respective countries 
perceive that such divergent trends exist and have cited dividend policy as a basis for 
advocating corporate tax reform.198  Thus, in the U.S., there has been a recent push to 
eliminate the double taxation of corporate income in part to combat the problem of 
declining dividends.  In the U.K., by contrast, there have been several movements toward 
a more classical corporate double tax system during the last half century because of 
concern about excessive dividends.   
A. U.S.
Although the U.S. has maintained its classical corporate income tax since 1936, 
concern about excessive retained earnings has helped prompt legislators to revisit this 
issue.  In January of 2003, President Bush announced a proposal to eliminate the double 
taxation of corporate income.199  Under his proposal, income would have been subject to 
the corporate income tax as under the current regime, but dividends on that income would 
have been exempt from the shareholder income tax.  According to Bush, the goal was to 
eliminate the double taxation of corporate income.  
195 See Jack W. Wilson & Charles P. Jones, An Analysis of the S&P 500 Index and Cowles's Extensions:  
Price Indexes and Stock Returns, 1870-1999, 75 J. BUS. 505, 527-531 (2002) (Appendix:  Table A1) (U.S. 
Dividend Payout Ratio, 1871-2000).
196 See Stephen Bond et al., Company Dividends and Taxes in the UK, 16 FISCAL STUD. No. 3, 1, 3-5 
(1995); Barry Riley, Chemical Reactions, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27/28, 1993, at II.  
197 See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY WHITE PAPER, COMPETITIVENESS:  FORGING AHEAD, Cmd. 
2867, p. 169 (HMSO 1995), available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/dti/dti-
comp/c13-169.htm (visited July 29, 2003) (suggesting US post-tax net dividend payout ratio far exceeded 
that of the UK until the early 1990s when they reversed places).
198 See, e.g., Neil Bennett, City Fears Dorrell's Dividend Designs, LONDON TIMES, June 6, 1994.
(suggesting that a Treasury official's claim that there was a run-up in dividends was partly a misperception 
of the data).
199
 White House News Release, President Bush Taking Action to Strengthen America's Economy, Jan. 7, 
2003.
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One significant factor prompting the Bush proposal was the perception that 
corporations were unnecessarily retaining earnings due to the tax disincentive for 
dividends and that this was harming the economy.200  According to Treasury’s Blue Book 
on Integration, which was released in connection with the Bush announcement, “double 
taxation of corporate profits encourages a corporation to retain its earnings rather than 
distribute them in the form of dividends.”201  Treasury explained that “[t]his lessens the 
pressure on corporate managers to undertake only the most productive investments 
because corporate investments funded by retained earnings may receive less scrutiny than 
investments funded by outside equity or debt financing.”202  The Council of Economic 
Advisers concluded that the President's proposal might resolve this issue by increasing 
the percentage of corporate profits paid out as dividends by as much as four percentage 
points.203
Ultimately, the President's proposal was rejected in favor of more modest double 
tax relief, but relief nonetheless.  Under the Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 
200
 In the year preceding the release of Bush's proposal, there was a significant outcry in the press and 
among academics for action in the tax arena to address the issue of declining dividends.  See, e.g., James K. 
Glassman, Numbers You Can Trust, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2002, at H1 ("Unfortunately, dividends are 
getting more scarce. . . . Double taxation encourages companies to hold on to most of what they earn, 
whether the companies really need the money or not."); Siegel, supra note 28, at A20 ("What contributed to 
the sharp fall in the dividend yield? . . . our tax system has played a crucial role."); Amit Ghate, Eliminate 
Double Taxation of Dividends, CAPITALISM MAGAZINE.COM, April 14, 2002; Steve Stein, Taxes, 
Dividends, and Distortions, POL'Y REV., June-July 2002, at 59; McCaffery, supra note 28, at B2 ("If we 
repealed the corporate income tax . . .[c]orporations would no longer have an excuse for growing large, or 
an incentive for hiding their gains from everyone to avoid taxation.  They could instead pay dividends."); 
Paul Gompers et al., This Tax Cut Will Pay Dividends, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2002, at A20 ("A the top of 
his agenda should be the elimination of one of the most detrimental taxes in our economy -- the corporate 
dividend tax.  The sharp decline in cash dividends on common stocks over the past decade has been the 
major cause of the woes bedeviling the stock market."); Editorial, Bring Back Dividends, WALL ST. J. 
ONLINE, Aug. 6, 2002 ("There is, however, one big problem with dividends:  The government taxes them 
twice. . . Little wonder then that over the past decade or so, as investors become more sensitive to taxes, 
they start rewarding companies for retaining earnings instead of paying out dividends."); James Glassman, 
Liberate the Dividend, AM. ENTERPRISE, Sept. 2002, at 13.
201 See Bluebook on Integration, supra note 29. 
202 Id.
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2003, "qualified dividend income" is taxed at the same rate as capital gains.204  Dividend 
income is considered qualified if it comes from a taxable domestic corporation and if the 
recipient has held the corporation's shares upon which the dividend was paid for at least 
sixty days prior to the ex-dividend date.205  When coupled with the reduction of the 
maximum capital gains rate from 20 to 15 percent, the tax rate on dividends thus was cut 
by more than half for taxpayers subject to the top individual rates. 
While the bill as passed was more modest than the original proposal, it was still 
justified in part by reference to the retained earnings issue.  The House Ways & Means 
Committee, in its Report commenting on the final bill, highlighted the concern over 
retained earnings:
 [P]resent law, by taxing dividend income at a higher rate than income from 
capital gains, encourages corporations to retain earnings rather than to distribute 
them as taxable dividends.  If dividends are discouraged, shareholder may prefer 
that corporate management retain and reinvest earnings rather than pay out 
dividends, even if the shareholder might have an alternative use for the funds that 
could offer a higher rate of return than that earned on the retained earnings.206
By placing dividends on the same footing as capital gains, Congress hoped that 
corporations would not be subject to the pressure to reflect all gains in the stock price, but 
would instead be encouraged to distribute more dividends. 
B. U.K.
While dividend policy has continued to affect corporate tax policy in the U.K. as 
well, the British have been concerned about excessive dividends rather than excessive 
retained earnings.  There have been three episodes during the post-World War II era 
203 See Council of Economic Advisers Briefing Paper on Dividend Tax Cut, 2003 TNT 5-27 (citing a 1992 
Treasury study on integration).
204
 I.R.C. § 1(h)(11).
205 Id.
206 H. REP. NO. 108-94, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (2003).
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where such concern prompted a turn toward a more classical corporate double tax:  (1)  
Between 1947 and 1958 when British companies were subject to a differential profits tax 
that levied a high rate on distributions than retentions; (2) Between 1965 and 1973 when 
Parliament experimented with a classical corporate double tax system; and (3) in 1997 
and 1999 when the refundable shareholder dividend tax credit was eliminated and the 
credit amount was substantially reduced. 
1. 1947-1958
Parliament continued the shareholder imputation system for taxing corporate
income throughout the 1930s, but concerns about dividend policy began to affect tax 
decisions.  In 1937, Parliament imposed a “National Defence Contribution” on profits of 
all businesses,207 although this tax did not single out corporations and was considered a 
temporary wartime measure.208  Soon thereafter, however, Parliament became concerned 
with the amount of dividends companies were paying in the face of the growing crisis.  A 
proposal to impose a statutory limit on dividends received considerable support until it 
was dropped in favor of the reenactment of the World War I-era Excess Profits Tax in 
1939.209
207
 Finance Act of 1937, §§ 19-25.
208 See 322 PARL. DEB.,  H.C. (5th ser.)  1617 (1937) (statement of Mr. Chamberlain) (“In those 
circumstances it does not seem to me to be unreasonable to ask that this growth in business profits should 
be made the occasion of some special and temporary contribution on the part of those concerns which have 
benefited, towards the cost of National Defence.”); The New Excess Profits Tax, TIMES (London), Apr. 21, 
1937, at 22 ("This revival of the excess profits duty is, of course, in fulfillment of the Government's 
undertaking that profiteering shall not be allowed in connection with the rearmament programme."); A. 
Farnsworth, Some Reflections Upon the Finance Act, 1937, 1 MOD. L. REV. 288, 290-91 (1938). 
209
 Finance (No. 2) Act of 1939, Part III; Business Notes, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 1946, at 384, 385.
DRAFT 7/13/2004
53
At the end of World War II, dividends became the object of “widespread 
prejudice." 210  This was especially true in the Labour Party, where unearned income such 
as dividends in the hands of shareholders was viewed as an obstacle to egalitarianism and 
reinvested profits were an acceptable and efficient step toward supply-side economic 
planning and even nationalized production.211  On a more immediate level, there were 
two complaints about the high level of dividends.  First, critics charged that dividends 
contributed to post- war inflation by increasing consumer spending.212  Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, dividends were viewed as an obstacle to the capital investment 
necessary to rebuild post-War England.  In a speech to Parliament in 1945, Hugh Dalton, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, pleaded with business to cut back on their dividends:
The reduction of the standard rate . . . benefits companies as well as individuals, 
but I hope that the resulting increase in net profits of companies will be spent on 
new and up-to-date plant and will not go straight into the shareholders' pockets.  
We cannot afford that right now.  In the national interest, capital development 
must stand in front of high dividends, particularly in the critical next years when 
we have to convert and modernise at high speed so large a part of our industrial 
outfit, much of which is badly outmoded.213
Soon after this speech, Dalton announced that the Excess Profits Tax would be repealed 
as of the end of 1946, but the National Defence Contribution would continue as the 
“Profits Tax.”214  While he did not define the contours of this new Profits Tax, he 
indicated that it would be determined to some extent by the direction of company 
210 Business Notes, supra note 282, at 385.  See DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 199 (noting that the prejudice 
against dividends, but not on the reinvestment of company profits in the business, was part of a Labour 
“belief that wealth became more reprehensible as it was further removed from its active creation.”).
211 See DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 201-02.
212 See, e.g., Taxes and Incentives, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1946, at 545, 546; 436 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) 1122 (1947) (statement of Major Bruce) ("After having pronounced this grave homily on the danger to 
the nation, they would proceed to add to the inflationary position by declaring an increased dividend for 
distribution among their shareholders."). 
213
 414 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1896-97 (1945) (statement of Mr. Dalton). 
214 See 421 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1834 (1946) (statement of Mr. Dalton).
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dividend policy.215  Dalton reported that industry's response to his invitation to engage in 
voluntary dividend restraint "has been patchy.  Many of the most efficient and up to date 
concerns have responded very well; but others have shown a tendency to chuck money 
about among the shareholders, rather than to strengthen their reserves and improve their 
equipment."216  He suggested that "it would be premature for me to decide now whether 
or not, next year, it would be in the general interest to introduce a new tax, designed to 
check these, as I think, unfortunate practices."217
Business' apparent failure to heed Dalton's plea against increasing dividends led to 
the first substantial deviation from the shareholder-focused model of corporate taxation 
after the end of World War II.218  In 1947, Dalton proposed to modify the Profits Tax so 
as to levy a heavier burden on distributed than retained earnings.219  In introducing this 
measure, Dalton explained 
I cannot pretend to be satisfied with the large increases in distributed profits and 
the higher dividends which have been paid out in so very many cases in the last 
12 months.  Too much, in my judgment, has been distributed, and too little 
ploughed back into the business.  These increased dividends are the clearest case, 
anywhere in our national economy, of an inflationary element.220
215 Id.
216
 421 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1833 (1946) (statement of Mr. Dalton).
217 Id.
218
 Dalton’s claim that business had failed to stem the increase in dividends was not uncontroversial.  One 
member cited articles in the Economist and the Times that reported annual figures suggesting that dividend 
payout ratio and retained earnings percentage numbers were flat).  See 436 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 
1117-18 (1947) (statement of Mr. Assheton) (citing a report in the Economist that companies paid 53.5 
percent of profits as dividends in 1945 and 53.2 percent in 1946 and a report in the Times that companies 
put 24.7 percent of profits into free reserves in 1945 and 25.6 percent in 1946).  Others rejected such 
figures, reporting anecdotal evidence that many large companies had increased their dividend.  See 436 
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1121 (1947) (statement of Mr. Bruce) (“All I can say is that, of the large number 
of companies whose results I was examining in the files of “The Times,” I could not find one case where 
there had been a diminution in the dividend last year as compared with the previous year.”).  
219 See 436 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 84 (1947) (statement of Mr. Dalton).
220 Id.
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Under Dalton’s proposal, undistributed profits would be subject to the prevailing rate of 5 
percent, but distributed profits would be subject to a rate of 12.5 percent.221  Soon after its 
passage, those rates were raised to 10 percent on distributed profits and 25 percent on 
undistributed profits because of what Dalton called “a continuing and persistent 
inclination on the part of many concerns to declare increased dividends.”222  The 
doubling of the rates was said to constitute a "psychologically much greater" inducement 
to retain earnings, "whatever may be the mathematics of the matter."223  As profits 
increased and the rate of dividends did not appear to decline, the tax on distributed profits 
rose dramatically, to 30 percent in 1950 and 50 percent in 1951.224  As contemporary 
observers noted, the British Profits Tax was "in direct contrast" to the Undistributed 
Profits Tax enacted in the U.S. in 1936.225
In 1951, Labour lost control of government and the Conservatives took office 
with an eye toward reforming the profits tax.  The tax on distributed profits was reduced 
from 50 percent to 22.5 percent and the tax on undistributed profits was lowered from 10 
221 Id. Only corporations would be subject to this new profits tax scheme, both because individuals and 
partners were already subject to the individual surtax and because they had only accounted for a small 
percentage of the revenues from the prior version of the profits tax. Id. at 85.
222 See 444 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 401 (1947) ; Parliament, TIMES (London), Nov. 13, 1947, at 6.  This 
may have been prompted in part by some members' calls for higher rates soon after Dalton’s proposal was 
announced.  See 436 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1126-27 (1947) (statement of Mr. Beswick) (“I do not 
think this tax of 12½ per cent. goes far enough to limit these profits.  I have been surprised by the lack of 
energy with which the Opposition have attacked this Profits Tax.  The reason why they have displayed such 
lack of energy is because, in my view, they were expecting a heavier Profits Tax.  I think there was some 
reason for reducing the 60 per cent. E.P.T., but I do not think there was any reason for reducing it down to 
12½ per cent.”).   
223 Profits, Taxes and Dividends, TIMES (London), Nov. 17, 1947, at 7.
224 See DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 211 (noting that the 50 percent tax on distributed profits was proposed in 
conjunction with a statutory limit on dividends, which was never implemented).  
225
 Beck, supra note 30, at 275 ("The profits tax of 1947 is specifically designed to encourage retention of 
earnings, a policy which is in direct contrast to current American and Canadian tax policy aimed at 
discouraging excessive corporate accumulation.").  John Maynard Keynes wrote in 1946 that he objected to 
the possibility of differential profits taxation in the U.K., pointing out that the surtax creates a bias to under, 
rather than over-declare dividends, as evidenced by the case of the U.S.:  “In the United States this bias has 
now reached quite extravagant lengths.  The New Dealers have tried to devise all sorts of ways of 
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percent to 2.5 percent.226  Even before the transfer of power took place, a Royal 
Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income was convened to investigate the 
effectiveness of the current structure and to recommend changes if necessary.  The 
Commission held hearings on the profits tax and most of the major business trade groups 
submitted reports and offered testimony.
During the hearings, it became clear that U.K. companies were less concerned 
with the differential nature of the profits tax as they were with the possibility that it was 
the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent for conversion to a classical corporate income 
tax.227 As the Federation of British Industries (the “Federation”) had explained in its 
original testimony before the Royal Commission, “[a] profits tax is not deductible from a 
dividend that is paid.”228  Thus, unlike with the British income tax, the profits tax could 
be considered a tax on the company as a separate entity.  In 1952, the Federation of 
British Industries (the “Federation”) emphasized this point in its second memorandum to 
the Royal Commission, stating that “[i]t is the gravamen of the criticism of Profits Tax, 
that it is a corporate tax which cannot be specifically passed on to shareholders.”229
When pressed to choose which tax was worse, the one on distributed or retained profits, 
encouraging larger declaration of dividends.”  DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 204 (quoting Keynes, The 
Dividend Policy of Companies, Mar. 31, 1946, located in Public Records Office, T171/388). 
226 See DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 211.
227
 The business trade groups did not object to the heavier tax on distributions in part because they believed 
that higher dividends led to demand for higher wages, a claim made by Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Gaitskell in his 1951 budget message.  See A. Rubner, The Irrelevancy of the British Differential Profits 
Tax, 74 ECON. J. 347, 352 (1964).  The theory, which was controversial even within the Federation of 
British Industries and National Union of Manufacturers, was that companies needed some external 
constraint to aid in wage negotiations with unions.  Id.  Of course, this theory assumed union leaders 
naively looked to dividends and not gross profits in considering what the company could afford to pay its 
workers.  Id.
228
 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income 84 
(Nov. 1, 1951) (testimony of S.P. Chambers, C.D. Hellyar, and A.G. Davies on behalf of the Federation of 
British Industries).
229
 Federation of British Industries, Second Memorandum to the Royal Commission on the Taxation of 
Profits and Income 30 (1952).
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the Federation chose the undistributed profits tax in part because it was the most direct 
example of a separate entity tax.230
By the middle of the 1950s, opponents were aided in their cause by the growing 
sense that the profits tax had done little to effectively stem the tide of dividends or 
increase the amount of productive investment.231  In 1954, one British economist 
published a report questioning whether the profits tax could actually lower dividends.232
The argument was that since British companies had a highly inelastic tendency to 
distribute dividends regardless of the amount of their profits, a punitive tax on dividends 
would not lessen the flow of dividends.233  Businesses would simply pay the tax by 
further reducing savings.234  This and other reports were apparently sufficient to convince 
a majority of the Royal Commission that the differential profits tax was no longer worth 
pursuing as an indirect limit on dividends.  In its final report, it concluded that the tax 
has not prevented the increase in amounts distributed by way of dividend which 
has been noticeable since 1953, and we are disposed to think that, even with the 
present big difference between the distributed and undistributed rates, it can only 
have a minor influence on distribution policy when other influences combine to 
pull in the opposite direction.235
230
 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income 84, par. 
808 (Nov. 1, 1951) (testimony of S.P. Chambers, C.D. Hellyar, and A.G. Davies on behalf of the 
Federation of British Industries).  After conceding that the undistributed profits tax was the most 
objectionable, the Federation quickly noted, however, that “every time there is an additional profits tax on 
distributed profits there appears to be the inference that the payment of dividends is a bad and an improper 
thing; that, from the point of view of British industry, we regard as unsound.” Id.  The National Union of 
Manufacturers also argued against any tax on retained profits, arguing that the company-level tax had 
curtailed capital investment and cut into, rather than increased, retained earnings available to fund projects.  
See Tax on Undistributed Profits, Manufacturers’ Call for Abolition, TIMES (London), Apr. 2, 1951, at 3. 
231
 One business reaction which contributed to this development was the migration of British companies 
overseas in order to avoid the profits tax.  See Arnold A. Rogow, Taxation and "Fair Shares" Under the 
Labour Government, 21 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 204, 213 (1955).  Labour even attempted to 
restrict this migration by inserting a provision in the 1951 Finance Act that made it illegal to migrate 
overseas if it resulted in evasion of tax liability.  Id.
232 See Rubner, supra note 227, at 353 (citing D. Walker, Some Economic Aspects of the Taxation of 
Companies, Manchester School, Manchester (Jan. 1954)). 
233 Id.
234 Id.
235
 Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Final Report, Cmd. 9474, at 159 (June 1955).
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When coupled with the fact that there was no evidence that any retained earnings were 
profitably spent,236 and that the differential only served to introduce complexity,237 a 
majority of the Royal Commission recommended ending the differential feature.238
Nicholas Kaldor authored a dissent on behalf of himself and two other members of the 
commission.239  They disputed the majority's finding that dividends had not been affected 
by the differential rates, but conceded that a higher differential might be even more 
effective.240  The minority opposed the repeal of the differential feature unless it was part 
of a larger reform including the taxation of capital gains.241  In a move that foreshadowed 
developments to come later, Nicholas Kaldor recommended that the U.K. eventually 
adopt a classical corporate income tax system.242
Initially, the minority's views appeared to carry the day.243  The then-ruling 
Conservatives increased the tax on distributed earnings each of the next two years.244
When this failed to have the desired effect on dividend policy, however, the 
236 Id.
237 Id. at 157.
238 Id. at 159-60 (“The use of differential rates may have been of some value in the immediate post-war 
years but the argument against such a tax structure increase with the years and in the end must prove 
decisive.  We recommend that the differential rates should be brought to an end.”). 
239 See Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Memorandum of Dissent to Final Report, 
Cmd. 9474, at 354, 382-83 (June 1955) (signed by G. Woodcock, H.L Bullock, and N. Kaldor) (hereinafter 
"1955 Memorandum of Dissent"). 
240 Id. at 386 (par. 99) ("The existence of the differential profits tax has undoubtedly been a major cause of 
the relatively modesty of dividend distributions as compared with the rise of earnings."); id. at 388 (par. 
105) ("Nobody would dispute that a differential rate of say, 50 per cent. would not only prevent increased 
distributions but force companies to reduce the existing level of dividends.").
241 Id. at 388 ("We are strongly opposed therefore to the recommendation of the Majority that the 
differential profits tax should be abolished forthwith, quite independently of whether capital gains are taxed 
or not; though we would favour such a change as part of a wider reform which included the taxation of 
capital gains").  In the U.K., capital gains were not taxed until 1965.  See John Tiley, United Kingdom , in
COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION :  A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 109, 113 (Hugh Ault, ed., 1997).
242 See 1955 Memorandum of Dissent, supra note 239, at 383-84.
243
 Some suggested that the minority also opposed the differential profits tax, see T. Balogh, Differential 
Profits Tax, 68 ECON. J. 528 (1958), but this is clearly untrue in at least the short term.  See supra note 241.
244 See Rubner, supra note 227, at 354 (The minority's "prognosis was published in June 1955; in the 
autumn of the same year the Conservative Chancellor accepted this recommendation of the minority and 
widened the differential in the profits tax from 1:9 to 1:11.").
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Conservatives implicitly declared the experiment with differential rates to be over when it 
omitted the differential rates from its 1958 budget proposal.245  Perhaps sensing that its 
argument that the rise in dividends would have been greater in the absence of the 
preferential rates lacked rhetorical force, "the Labour Party did not mount a concerted 
attack" against this omission.246
2. 1965-1973
Not long after the repeal of the differential feature of the profits tax, the 
government once again became concerned with the dividends and industrial 
investment.247  In his budget statement to Parliament in November of 1964, James 
Callaghan, Labour's newly-appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, expressed concern 
with the current system.  According to Callaghan, the corporate income tax system "does 
not provide sufficient incentive to companies to plough back profits for growth rather 
than to distribute them as dividends."248  While the government had enacted a generous 
set of depreciation deductions in 1954 with the goal of increasing investment, Callaghan 
believed that they were insufficient by themselves to make a difference.249
To further increase the incentive for corporations to retain earnings, Callaghan 
proposed reforming the tax system.  Rather than returning to the 1950s differential profits 
tax feature, however, Callaghan advocated repealing the profits tax and the adoption of 
245 Id.
246 Id.
247
 According to one account, "[w]hen the differentiated Profits Tax was abolished in 1958, and tax 
incentive for retentions was removed, there was an immediate upsurge in distributions, and that has 
continued to the present day."  712 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 52 (1965) (statement of Mr. Niall 
MacDermot).  See 713 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1834 (1965) (statement of Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury, John Diamond) (“Previously we had a system which encouraged retention and that was replaced
by a single-tier Profits Tax which removed that encouragement to retention.  Therefore, there was further 
distribution, and the rate of growth of dividends went up by 50 per cent. as a result.”).
248
 701 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1041 (1964) (statement of Mr. Callaghan).
249
 Callaghan, supra note 31, at 214.
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the classical corporate income tax recommended by Kaldor in 1955.250  According to 
Callaghan, separating the corporate and individual income taxes would have the added 
benefits of simplifying the tax structure, ending certain abuses of the system, and 
permitting the separation of corporate and individual tax rates.251  Corporate income 
would thus be subject to tax at both the corporate level when earned and again at the 
shareholder level when distributed as a dividend.  Unlike the U.S., where the shareholder-
level tax was paid by the shareholders themselves, companies would be directed to 
withhold and remit the shareholder-level tax when dividends were paid.252  While 
Callaghan conceded that this new system would subject company profits to double 
taxation, he noted that Parliament had long since abandoned the single tax concept when 
it introduced the profits tax.253
250 See supra text accompanying note 242.  Since Kaldor's recommendation for a classical corporate tax 
system in 1955, a series of writers had pushed the concept in subsequent years.  See 712 PARL. DEB., H.C. 
(5th ser.) 51 (1965) (statement of Mr. Niall MacDermot) (citing "Taxes for Today," a 1958 pamphlet 
published by the Conservative Political Centre, "The Young Conservative, a 1963 pamphlet, and an article 
on Tory policy in the July 27, 1964 issue of the Daily Telegraph); DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 291 (Kaldor 
"continued to press for a return to differentiation in the party debates of the late 1950s and early 1960s.").
251 See 701 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1041-42 (1964) (statement of Mr. Callaghan).  The ability to impose 
separate rates at the corporate and individual levels was thought to permit government to target tax 
incentives as an aid to national planning of the economy.  See DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 291-92.
  An additional concern was that money was being invested overseas rather than in British industry.  See
712 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 57 (1965) (statement of Mr. MacDermott).  While this issue was heavily 
debated, some suspected it was not an original justification for the measure, but was only added as the 
balance of payments started to become a concern.  See 713 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1828 (1965) 
(statement of Mr. Biffen) (“I regard this argument [that the position of overseas investment has necessitated 
the introduction of the Corporation Tax] with a great deal of suspicion, not least because, when the 
Chancellor first announced the Corporation Tax, last November, he made no reference whatsoever to the 
fact that it would be of some assistance to our overseas situation.”).
252
 This was justified "[a]s a matter of administrative convenience."  Shareholders who were exempt from 
tax or not subject to tax at the full standard rate were entitled to file a refund claim.  See Callaghan, supra
note 31, at 214.
253 See 710 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 254 (1965) (statement of Mr. Callaghan) (“Hitherto any idea of 
reforming the Tax system by introducing a Corporation tax in this country has foundered because of the 
widely held view that to levy a separate tax on company profits which is distinct from, and additional to, 
the Income Tax levied on individuals would constitute “double taxation” of company profits.  The Profits 
Tax already contradicts this argument.”).  Opponents countered that the differential profits tax only 
imposed a 15 percent burden while the proposed Corporation Tax would impose a double tax burden of 
between 35 and 40 percent.  See 713 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1724 (1965) (statement of Mr. Barber).  
As the Inland Revenue had itself concluded in 1959, "[a]ll the history and tradition behind our tax code 
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Debate over the proposal centered at least in part around the claim that it would 
spur productive reinvestment of profits, although there was also dispute as to whether 
retentions would increase at all.254  Gresham Cooke argued that the concept was “old-
fashioned.”255  He noted that “other countries are seeing that old established, undynamic 
companies can go on adding to their retentions year after year without any great benefit 
to themselves or their country.  They can have a long series of profitless expansions.”256
J. Grimond confirmed that this phenomenon was occurring in the U.K. as well.  
According to Grimond, "[s]ome big companies appear to be diversifying their activities 
because they have nothing else to do with the large funds which they acquire.  Some 
companies should curtail their activities and distribute their reserves rather than retain 
money on which they do not earn as high a rate as is needed in the national interest."257
A recently published study by the economist Ian Little, which tentatively concluded that 
retained earnings as a result of the differential profits tax in the 1950s were inefficiently 
employed,258 was cited prominently in support of the Conservative opposition’s 
arguments.259  Terrence Higgins summed up the disagreement over the corporation tax as 
lying between “whether we believe profits should be ploughed back into companies and 
taxes should encourage this, or whether we should encourage the distribution of profits 
could be prayed in aid of this criticism."  R.C. Whiting, Ideology and Reform in Labour's Tax Strategy, 
1964-1970, 41 HIST. J. 1121, 1123 (1998) (quoting Board of Internal Revenue, A Corporation Tax, Public 
Record Office, Treasury Budget Papers T 171/508 (Dec. 30, 1959)).
254
 Some opponents argued that the “stickiness” of dividend rates meant that companies would pay the 
additional corporate tax out of money that would otherwise be available for “ploughing back” into the firm.  
See, e.g., 713 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1879 (1965) (statement of Mr. Barber).
255 Id. at 1000 (statement of Mr. Gresham Cooke).
256 Id. 
257
 712 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 94 (1965) (statement of Mr. J. Grimond).
258 See I.M.D. Little, Higgledy-Piggledy Growth, 24 BULL. OXFORD INST. OF STATISTICS 412 (1962).
259 See 713 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1885 (1965) (statement of Mr. Patrick Jenkin).
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and the operation of the capital market in such a way that capital is attracted into new 
uses by market forces.”260  According to Higgins, 
[w]e on this side believe strongly that it is better that the balance should be in 
favour of distribution rather than that there should be a very serious move in 
favour of ploughing back.  If one ploughs back, it means that capital is retained by 
those companies which are already in existence.  This in turn, means that there is 
less opportunity for new firms to obtain capital needed to expand and these firms 
are, indeed, the growth points of the economy.  This is a fundamental difference 
between the two parties.261
Opponents concluded that companies were more efficient when they were subject to the 
scrutiny of the capital markets in order to obtain more funds.262
Proponents of the move to a classical corporate income tax argued that retentions 
were the most likely source of new investment in the British economy.263  According to 
the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Niall MacDermott, evidence presented to the 
1955 Royal Commission had established that "the amount of new money raised through 
the market is marginal in relation to the total investment.  It is retentions that are 
responsible for far the greater part of capital investment in the private sector."264   The 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, John Diamond, further substantiated such evidence, 
noting that only 9 percent of new investment came from cash raised through public issues 
of stock, while 65 percent came from retained earnings and the rest from borrowing.265
Diamond explained that “[w]e are, therefore, framing a tax structure under which a 
260
 710 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1051 (1965) (statement of Mr. Terrence Higgins).
261 Id.
262 Id. (citing Little’s study)
263 See 712 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 53 (1965) (statement of Mr. Niall MacDermot) ("it is from retentions 
that the great weight of money comes for industrial and commercial expansion."); id. at 130 (statement of 
Mr. A.E.P. Duffy) ("Many hon. Members recognise now that the bulk of firms get the bulk of their 
additional capital  for necessary growth out of retained profits.").
264 Id. at 52-53 (citing evidence offered by the Issuing Houses Committee).  See Callaghan, supra note 31, 
at 215 (“in the United Kingdom it does seem that the main source of finance for industrial investment is 
nowadays ‘plough back.’”).
265
 713 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1835-36 (1965) (statement of John Diamond).
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business man will, out of his realised profits, have 50 per cent. more cash available for 
investment and plough-back than he has under the present system”266  While he conceded 
that “[o]ne cannot make individuals who are inefficient efficient” simply by providing 
additional funds, Diamond suggested that the bill would “encourage them towards 
efficiency and give them the tools to achieve it.”267
As one would expect from American firms with professional managers and 
dispersed owners, some larger British companies appeared to support this conversion to a 
double tax system.268  According to The Economist, "a good few company chairman" 
applauded the proposed adoption of a tax disincentive to distributions because they saw 
"dividends as an extravagance and retained profits as the real source of expansion."269
Malcolm Crawford explained, "companies in industry and commerce here prefer 
financing from retentions, treating external finance as a residual source, for meeting 
peaks in investment programmes, or when forced into the market by a credit squeeze."270
As evidence of the residual nature of capital market financing, Crawford noted that large 
dividend distributions were not matched by large public offerings of additional stock.271
There was some suggestion that stockholder pressure would counterbalance business' 
266 Id. at1833.
267 Id.
268
 While individual companies may have preferred the Labour proposal, the Federation of British 
Industries appears to have lined up with the Opposition in favoring a dividend-friendly system.  See
DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 320.  It is not clear why they took that approach, although it may have 
represented either an extension of their opposition to any entity-level tax, whether a profits tax or a 
corporation tax, that characterized their opposition in the 1950s, see supra text accompanying notes 304-07, 
or a concern for the instability that the new measures would bring.  See STEPHEN BLANK, INDUSTRY AND 
GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN:  THE FEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRIES IN POLITICS, 1945-65 224 (1973).
269 Labour's Tax Imprint, THE ECONOMIST 738 (1964).
270
 Malcolm Crawford, The 1965 Reforms in the British Tax System, MOORGATE AND WALL STREET, Aut. 
1965, at 38, 42.
271 Id.
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temptation to use the new tax as justification to increase retained earnings,272 but others 
thought that the tax would “widen the gulf between modern and contemporary industrial 
management and the shareholders” so as to increase the power of the former to ignore the 
demands of the latter.273
Callaghan's proposal for a classical corporate income tax was adopted in 1965,274
but it was the source of significant controversy almost from the beginning.  One 
commentator warned, rather caustically, “it is the height of folly” to simultaneously 
attempt to effect the “euthanasia of the shareholder” while “pay[ing] lip service to the 
merits of private enterprise.”275  Perhaps the most stinging blows came from reports that 
the introduction of the classical corporate income tax was having little effect on firm 
dividend policies or on economic growth.276
272 See 712 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 131-32 (1965) (statement of Mr. Duffy) ("We know, and some hon. 
Members opposite know better than we do, how many directors are so concerned for their standing in the 
markets that they will be tempted to cut back retentions to preserve dividends.").
273
 713 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1829 (1965) (statement of Mr. Biffen).
274
 Finance Act of 1965, §§ 46-89.  In another significant development, Parliament imposed a tax on long-
term capital gains for the first time (short-term capital gains were subject to tax under the Finance Act of 
1962).  This was ironic considering the tax on capital gains would likely reduce incentives for investment.  
One way to reconcile these two seemingly inconsistent prongs of Labour's tax strategy is by concluding 
that the Party wanted to encourage investment by business managers rather than by individuals.  See
Crawford, supra note 270, at 44.  Supporters also pointed out that it was possible to devise a capital gains 
tax that would not inhibit investment, but would still achieve its other goals.  See id. at 50.  A more 
pragmatic way to reconcile the corporate tax and capital gains tax is that since companies would 
presumably increase their retained earnings, share values would rise and corporations would extract their 
gains through sales of stock rather than dividends.  Those sales of stock, which were previously tax-free, 
would now be taxed.  Thus, the capital gains tax served as a substitute for the tax revenue from dividends.  
See DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 318-19.
275
 A.R. Hersic, Taxes 1964-66:  An Interim Appraisal, 1966 BRIT. TAX REV. 365, 373.
276 See R.J. Brinston & C.R. Tomkins, The Impact of the Introduction of Corporation Tax Upon the 
Dividend Policies of United Kingdom Companies, 80 ECON. J. 617, 627 (1970) (noting, in a study of 837 
U.K. firms, that retained earnings was typically a residual item after dividend payouts were met and 
therefore “[i]t would appear that companies can be encouraged to retain profits only by a fiscal policy 
which gives them increased earnings.”); DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 299 ("The Callaghan-Kaldor reforms 
were disappointing, for they produced little revenue and did not stimulate economic growth to any 
discernible extent.").
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Once the Conservatives regained office in 1970, they set about dismantling the 
corporation tax.277  In his March 30, 1971 Budget Statement, Anthony Barber, the new 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced the government's intention to replace the 
corporation tax and "the substantial discrimination which it entails in favour of retained 
as opposed to distributed profits."278  Rather than doing so immediately, though, Barber 
chose to publish his office's proposals in a "Green Paper” that would be made available 
for further consideration.279  In the Green Paper, Barber advocated a two-rate system 
much like the German approach in which distributed profits would be subject to tax at a 
lower rate than undistributed profits, but he also indicated willingness to consider a 
shareholder imputation system.280 A Select Committee on Corporation Tax was formed 
by the House of Commons to consider the proposals contained in the Green Paper.  In its 
report,281 the Select Committee recommended adoption of the shareholder imputation 
system in large part because of the concerns surrounding overseas income earned by UK 
companies.282
On April 6, 1973, Parliament adopted the Select Committee’s recommendations 
and thus ended the U.K.’s short experiment with a classical corporate income tax.283  In 
many respects, however, this new system was similar to the classical corporate tax that it 
277 DAUNTON, supra note 7, at 326.
278
 814 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1383 (1971) (statement of Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony 
Barber).
279 Id.; Reform of the Corporation Tax, Cmnd. 4630 (1971).  Part of the justification for delay was to permit 
possible coordination with the reform of corporation taxes among countries in the European Economic 
Community.  Id. at 2.
280 Id.
281 See Report from the Select Committee on Corporation Tax, Session 1970-71 (Oct. 20, 1971) (“Select 
Committee Report”).
282
 Id. at xiii, para. 24 (“The arguments in favour of the imputation system spring basically from this 
country’s position as an international trader and investor.  All whom Your Committee questioned agreed 
that the imputation system was preferable to the two-rate system as a basis for the renegotiation of double 
taxation agreements (which will be necessary whatever system is finally adopted.)).”
283
 Finance Act of 1972.
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replaced.284  Corporations were subject to tax on their income and dividends were not 
deductible from corporate income for purposes of calculating tax.  Shareholders were 
also subject to income tax on dividends received.  It also resembled the system in place 
prior to 1965, though, in that Parliament relieved double taxation of corporate income by 
providing shareholders a credit to relieve some of the tax paid at the corporate level.  
Much like the modern payroll withholding system, the dividend was grossed up to reflect 
both the cash paid and the credit, with the credit calculated so as to equal the income tax 
liability on the grossed-up dividend at the basic rate.  This meant that lower rate 
taxpayers had no further liability or were eligible for a refund if their rate was less than 
the base rate, such as with tax-exempt pension funds, while higher rate taxpayers were 
subject to tax on the additional amount.285
The most significant innovation from both the pre and post-1965 systems was the 
adoption of an Advance Corporation Tax (“ACT”).  Under this provision, a corporation 
had to pay a tax with respect to any dividends paid, irrespective of whether it actually had 
any tax liability.286  The ACT then could be offset against the corporation’s actual tax 
due.287  If the actual tax due was low relative to a company's dividend payments, such as 
when it has a bad year or when much of its profits are generated and taxed overseas, then 
the company receives surplus ACT credits that could be carried backward or forward 
over a period of years.  In effect, the ACT acted as a prepayment for the corporation’s 
actual tax liability.  This responded to one of the concerns with the pre- 1965 shareholder 
284 See Andreas Tontsch, Corporation Tax Systems and Fiscal Neutrality:  The UK and German Systems 
and Recent Changes, 30 INTERTAX 171, 175 (2002).
285 See id. at 175.
286 See Malcolm Gammie, UK Imputation, Past, Present and Future, BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION 429 (Oct. 1998).
287 Id.
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imputation system that related to the potential for the tax credit to exceed the amount of 
the corporation’s actual tax liability.
3. 1997
In the mid-1990s, the U.K. once again became concerned with dividends and firm 
investment.  A 1995 study published by the Institute for Fiscal Studies announced that 
there had been a dramatic rise in the percentage of profits paid out as dividends during 
the previous decade.288  In a press release accompanying this announcement, the IFS 
noted that "[t]he dividend payout ratio . . . is higher in the UK than in any other major 
economy.  There is a danger that these high dividend payouts are having an adverse effect 
on business investment."289  Other studies reached similar conclusions regarding the 
dangers of increased dividends.290  By 1997, with dividends continuing to rise and 
Labour poised to retake power for the first time in 18 years,291 the corporate tax system 
appeared to be headed for another revision.292
In his July 2, 1997 Budget Message, Chancellor Gorden Brown noted that 
"[s]ince 1980 the UK has invested a lower share of GDP than most other industrialised 
countries . . . . For every £100 invested per worker in the UK, Germany has invested over 
288 See Bond et al., supra note 196, at 3.
289 See Press Release, Company Dividends and Taxes in the UK (Aug. 31, 1995), available at 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/press/fsdivs.shtml, last visited on Aug. 21, 2002.
290 See David Wighton, Labour Tax Shake-Up Likely to Highlight Investment, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 1, 
1997, at 10 (citing a study by the Commission on Public Policy and British Business).
291 See Malcolm Gammie, The End of Imputation:  Changes in UK Dividend Taxation, 25 INTERTAX 333 
(1997).
292 See Barry Riley, Reaping Tory Dividends, FIN. TIMES (London), April 19, 1997 at 1; Robert Peston, 
Brown May Scrap Dividend Credit, Fin. Times (London), June 16, 1997, at 1; Jim Kelly, Under Fire for 
"Victimless" Tax Increase:  Brown May Defy Critics Over Dividend Credits, FIN. TIMES (London), June 16, 
1997, at 11; The Lex Column, Taxing Times, FIN. TIMES (London), June 16, 1997, at 22; Philip Coggan, 
Not the Easy Option, FIN. TIMES (London), June 21, 1997, at 8.
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£140, the US and France around £150, and Japan over £160 per worker."293  Brown 
announced that while the Labour Party had been studying the system for the past two 
years with an eye toward redressing this investment deficiency, "this point in the 
recovery is . . . the right time to make changes in corporation tax to encourage more long 
term investment."294  The bill for reform was passed in less than a month.295
Labour revised the corporate tax in two phases.  Effective immediately, it reduced 
the corporate tax rate by two percentage points and abolished the refundable shareholder 
dividend tax credit for tax-exempt institutional investors such as pension funds.296  Prior 
to this latter reform, a dividend of 80 to a tax-exempt investor was worth 100 because of 
the refund of the 20% tax credit then provided for under the partial imputation system.297
As Brown emphasized in his Budget Message, subsidizing dividend payments to pension 
funds, which owned more than half of all public stock at the time,298 "encourage[d] 
companies to pay out dividends rather than reinvest their profits."299  The parallel with 
Labour's 1965 reforms and the Kaldor's Minority Report to the 1955 Royal Commission 
was not lost on commentators,300 although this time it did not have the support of 
business trade groups.301
293
 The Chancellor's 1997 Budget Speech at para. 59, available at
http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/pub/html/budget97/chxstat2.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) ("1997 Budget 
Message").
294 Id. at paras. 60, 62.
295 See Gammie, supra note 291, at 333.
296
 Finance (No. 2) Act 1997, § 19.
297 See Gammie, supra note 291, at 335.
298 Id.
299
 1997 Budget Message, supra note 293, at para. 72.
300 See Graham Searjeant, Dividend Grab is Economic Nonsense, TIMES (London), July 24, 1997 ("The 
agenda is an old Labour one.  It dates back to the revolution in company tax made in Lord Callaghan's 
comparable first Labour Budget of 1965 . . . Essentially, Mr. Brown aims to reinstate the reforms proposed 
by the late old Labour Lord Kaldor a generation ago.").
301 See Brown's First Budget -- Business and Market Reaction, FIN. TIMES (London), July 3, 1997, at 3 (Mr. 
Adair Turner, director general of the Confederation of British Industries, said . . . one measure -- the radical 
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In the second phase of the revision to the corporate tax, effective April 6, 1999, 
the elimination of the refundable shareholder tax credit for tax-exempt investors was 
extended to taxable shareholders.302  The shareholder tax credit on dividends was also 
reduced from 20 percent to 10 percent.303  In an additional reform enacted in 1998, but 
implemented at the same time as the second phase of the 1997 reform, the ACT was 
abolished altogether.304 The combined effect of the 1997 and 1999 reforms has been to 
eliminate the U.K.'s shareholder imputation system and push it ever closer to a classical 
double tax.305
Conclusion
The dividend divide appears to have had a significant influence on the direction of 
corporate tax reform in the U.S. and U.K during the past century.  A consistent theme in 
the U.S. has been that dividends are too low and in the U.K. that dividends are too high.  
During periods of heightened concern about these trends, the U.S. and British corporate 
income taxes have been reformed accordingly.  Thus, the U.S. adopted a more 
integrationist approach to corporate taxation in both the New Deal and in the latest round 
of President Bush's tax cuts in part because dividends were perceived to be too low.
Similarly, on four separate occasions in the last half-century, the U.K. has adopted a more 
change to the corporation tax regime -- we do not support . . . The CBI is disappointed that such a major 
change in corporate taxation was introduced without proper prior consultation.").
302
 Finance (No. 2) Act of 1997, § 30.
303 Id.
304
 Finance Act of 1998, § 31.
305 See Casson, supra note 32, at 493 ("the abolition of advance corporation tax (ACT) with effect from 
April 1999 will mark the end of the imputation system of corporation tax introduced a quarter of a century 
ago."); Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1599 (noting that "[i]ntegration has been cut back severely in . . . the 
U.K."); Tontsch, supra note 284, at 178 ("With the abolition of ACT, the only link between the corporation 
tax paid by the company and the tax credit for the shareholder has been eliminated.  The tax credit is 
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classical approach to corporate taxation in part because of the perception that dividends 
were too high.  
There are several potential implications from the existence of a dividend divide in 
Anglo-American corporate taxation.  First, it serves as a cautionary note for those seeking 
to unify the tax treatment of corporate income in the U.S. and U.K. without considering 
the underlying difference in firm dividend policy and the perceptions of its importance in 
the two countries.  It may also help to provide a starting point for further investigations 
into why the U.S. corporate income tax has diverged from the corporate income taxes of 
other countries, such as France, Germany, Japan, and Italy, where similar reforms of the 
corporate income tax are either being considered or recently have been implemented.306
More broadly, it suggests that corporate tax policy may be dictated more by the 
realities of corporate behavior than the theories underlying the nature of the corporation 
as a separate taxable actor.  This is contrary both to the traditional assumptions regarding 
the divergence of the U.S. and British systems and to some recent views regarding the 
normative rationale for the corporate tax.307  Debunking this entity theory perspective 
may aid in the movement toward a more realistic approach to corporate taxation.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the dividend divide provides a counter-
story to the traditional argument that the design of a corporate income tax system exerts a 
granted regardless of whether any corporation tax has been paid on the profit at all.  Consequently, it 
cannot be said that corporation tax is imputed to the shareholder.").
306 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1600.  An alternative view is that each country is converging toward a 
system of partial integration, although this depends upon one's prediction about the end point for each 
system.  They may end up passing each other like ships in the night.
307 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State:  A Defense of the Corporate Tax
(unpublished manuscript, 2004) (suggesting a real entity theory of the corporation, although also arguing 
that this justifies the use of the corporate tax to regulate corporate behavior, which is consistent with the 
premises of the dividend divide).
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significant effect on corporate behavior.308  While it is true that the corporate income tax 
can distort decision-making and thereby introduce inefficiencies to the economy, too little 
has been said about the other side of the equation.  The corporate income tax is often 
structured as a response to corporate behavior that is considered improper either from a 
tax policy perspective (because it erodes the tax base) or from a corporate policy 
perspective (because it harms corporate shareholders, stakeholders or the economy 
generally).  It may be that tax is an inappropriate tool to address the latter concern,309 but 
it is well to recognize that the inefficiency may be an endogenous inefficiency that the 
corporate tax system is itself trying to correct or has been manipulated by corporate 
managers to cover.  In effect, the corporate tax system is not merely the source of several 
inefficiencies, but may be a part of the multitude of factors that reflect the inefficiencies 
in our corporate economy.
308 See, e.g., R. Glenn Hubbard, Corporate Tax Integration:  A View From the Treasury Department, 7 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 115, 117-18 (1993) ("The classical corporate income tax distorts three economic and 
financial decisions.  Namely, whether  to: (1) invest in noncorporate rather than corporate form; (2) finance 
investments with debt rather than equity; and (3) retain rather than distribute earnings."). 
309 See Bank, Norms, supra note 110 (distinguishing between corporate governance-oriented tax provisions 
that fail and those that survive).
